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ABSTRACT
Staggered boards, which a majority of public companies now have, provide a powerful
antitakeover defense, stronger than is commonly recognized.  They provide antitakeover protection both
by (i) forcing any hostile bidder, no matter when it emerges, to wait at least one year to gain control of
the board and (ii) requiring such a bidder to win two elections far apart in time rather than a one-time
referendum on its offer.  Using a new data set of hostile bids in the five-year period 1996-2000, we find
that not a single hostile bid won a ballot box victory against an "effective" staggered board (ESB).  We
also find that an ESB nearly doubled the odds of remaining independent for an average target in our data
set, from 34% to 61%, halved the odds that a first bidder would be successful, from 34% to 14%, and
reduced the odds of a sale to a white knight, from 32% to 25%.  Furthermore, we find that the
shareholders of targets that remained independent were made worse off compared with accepting the bid
and that ESBs did not provide sufficient countervailing benefits in terms of increased premiums to offset
the costs of remaining independent.  Overall, we estimate that, in the period studied, ESBs reduced the
returns of shareholders of hostile bid targets on the order of 8-10%.  Finally, we show that most staggered
boards were adopted before the developments in takeover doctrine that made ESBs such a potent defense.
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Staggered boards (SBs) are an important part of the modern U.S. 
corporate landscape.  In a large sample of major U.S. public companies, 59% 
had a staggered board in 1998.1  Among firms going public in the 1990s, the 
incidence of staggered boards increased from 34% in 1990 to over 70% in 
2001.2  Despite this large and growing importance in practice, the impact of 
staggered boards on the market for corporate control has not been 
adequately recognized by courts, academics, or practitioners. 
This Paper analyzes the key role that staggered boards play in the 
antitakeover protection that U.S. public companies now enjoy.  A staggered 
board, we argue, offers a more powerful antitakeover defense than has 
previously been recognized.  Whereas conventional wisdom holds that a 
company that becomes a takeover target is unlikely to remain independent, 
the managers of targets with staggered boards can—and most of the time 
do—maintain the target’s independence.  
Our work analyzes how staggered boards make it extremely difficult for 
a hostile bidder to gain control over the incumbents’ objections.  Using a new 
database of hostile bids against U.S. targets in the five-year period from 1996 
to 2000, we provide evidence that staggered boards indeed have the 
powerful antitakeover force suggested by our theory.  Finally, we show that 
the effectiveness of staggered boards reduces returns to target shareholders.  
The theory and evidence that we put forward have important implications 
for takeover regulation, and we examine the changes in takeover doctrine 
that they warrant. 
Staggered boards have increased in importance with the appearance and 
proliferation of poison pills.  Takeover law allows managers to maintain a 
pill and thereby impede a hostile bid, as long as they are in office.  As a 
result, when managers maintain their opposition to a hostile bid, the bidder 
 
1. See  VIRGINIA  K. ROSENBAUM, INVESTOR  RESPONSIBILITY  RESEARCH  CENTER, 
CORPORATE TAKEOVER DEFENSES (1993, 1998) (n=2,421).  IRRC includes all firms in the 
S&P 1500 plus additional firms “selected primarily on the basis of market capitalization 
and high institutional ownership levels.”  See ROSENBAUM (1998), supra, at ix. 
2. See John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 
89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1353, 1376 (2001) (finding 34% staggered board incidence in a 
sample of 160 IPO firms from the period 1991-92, 66% incidence in a sample of 160 IPO 
firms from the first nine months of 1998, and 82% incidence in a sample of 33 IPOs from 
1999); Takeover Defenses of Recent U.S. IPOs (chart showing 73% of IPOs had staggered 
boards in 2001), at http://www.sharkrepellent.net (last visited Jan. 16, 2002); see also 
Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?  Antitakeover 
Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 96 tbl. 2 (finding 44% staggered board 
incidence among a sample of 310 firms that went public between 1994 and 1997).  
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can obtain control only if it replaces the directors with ones that will redeem 
the pill.  This route of winning control of the board via a ballot box victory 
provides the safety valve on which takeover law has relied to protect 
shareholder interests.  However, we show that when a target has an effective 
staggered board (ESB)—a staggered board that is appropriately designed to 
prevent circumvention—this safety valve is illusory. 
There are two reasons why an ESB presents such a serious impediment to 
a hostile bidder seeking to gain control over the incumbents’ objections.   
First, an ESB substantially increases the delay involved in gaining control of 
the board and, importantly, establishes a large minimum delay.  No matter 
when a hostile bidder emerges, gaining control of the board would take at 
least one year, a very long time indeed in the dynamic world of corporate 
acquisitions.  Second, beyond the costs imposed by delay, to overcome an 
ESB a bidder must win two elections, far apart in time, rather than one up-or-
down referendum conducted at a single point in time.  We show that the 
two-election problem is a serious one that, combined with the delay problem, 
makes an ESB a powerful, even if not insurmountable, antitakeover device.  
Indeed, we show that an ESB provides managers with stronger protection 
from a hostile takeover than would an arrangement (not currently permitted 
under Delaware law) providing directors with guaranteed three-year terms. 
After developing our theory of staggered boards, we test it against a new 
database of hostile bids made against U.S.  targets in the five-year period 
from 1996 to 2000.  We find that during this period not a single hostile bidder 
gained control of the board of an ESB target board through a ballot box 
victory.  The great difficulty that hostile bidders would have in gaining 
control of the board of a target with an ESB significantly reduces the 
credibility of the threat to do so, which in turn increases incumbents’ power 
to insist on remaining independent.  Specifically, we find that an ESB nearly 
doubles the likelihood that the average target in our data set will remain 
independent, from 34% to 61%; halves the likelihood that the first bidder will 
be successful, from 34% to 14%; and reduces the likelihood that a target will 
be forced to sell to a white knight or other subsequent bidder, from 32% to 
25%. 
We also find that the substantial increase in the likelihood of remaining 
independent produced by ESBs is rather costly for target shareholders.   
Remaining independent makes shareholders worse off compared with the 
scenario in which the hostile bid is accepted.  Furthermore, we find that ESBs 
do not provide sufficient countervailing benefits in terms of increased 
premiums and may even provide no such benefits at all.  Overall, we find 
that ESBs reduced returns on the order of 8-10% for shareholders of hostile 
bid targets in the latter half of the 1990s.  Some of the statistical tests whose 
results we report here are presented in greater detail in a more technical  
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companion working paper.3 
These findings lend new significance to shareholder proposals 
demanding de-staggering of SBs, proposals that have become far more 
numerous and popular (with shareholders) in recent years.4  More generally, 
these findings have important implications in the U.S. market for corporate 
control and the broader business landscape.  Staggered boards play a key 
role in determining the extent to which managers of U.S. companies are 
vulnerable to a takeover threat.  The theoretical arguments and empirical 
evidence presented here suggest that ESBs substantially increase the 
insulation of incumbents from takeovers and have the potential to reduce 
shareholder wealth. 
After analyzing the antitakeover consequences of staggered boards, we 
examine how we have arrived at this state of affairs.  We compare the 
evolution of takeover law with the timing of staggered board incidence.  We 
show that most companies that now have staggered boards adopted them 
before shareholders could have been fully aware of the powerful 
antitakeover force that was accorded to them by subsequent developments in 
takeover law.  Specifically, shareholders that had approved staggered boards 
prior to 1990 found themselves in the 1990s stuck with an arrangement 
whose full antitakeover power they could not have earlier anticipated.  In the 
1990s, shareholders began to comprehend the full antitakeover force of 
staggered boards and, led by activist institutional investors, began voting 
against proposals to adopt new staggered boards and for precatory (non-
binding) proposals to rescind existing ones.5  For most companies, however, 
this shareholder activism amounted to “too little, too late,” because the 
majority of large companies had already adopted staggered boards, which 
shareholders do not have the power to undo.  
Our conclusions concerning the special antitakeover power of staggered 
boards call for a reconsideration of existing takeover law.  Courts have 
sought to strike a balance between the goals of protecting shareholders from 
 
3. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Effects 
of Takeover Defenses (working paper, 2002). 
4. See Jason D. Montgomery, Classified Boards, Corporate Governance Services, 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (Mar. 3, 1998); Record Support for Destaggered 
Boards Highlights Shareholder Proposal Results, Corporate Governance Highlights, 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (June 18, 1998), at 97. 
5. New staggered boards emerged throughout the 1990s, however, in IPOs.  See 
Coates, supra note 2, at 1377; Daines & Klausner, supra note 2, at 96 tbl. 2.  Shareholders 
have been willing to buy shares from companies that have staggered boards in their 
initial charter. In those cases, the initial price could reflect the costs to shareholders of 
staggered boards, although it is also possible that investors in IPOs are still not fully 
aware of the antitakeover potential of staggered boards.  See infra Part II.D.  
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threats that some hostile offers might present and preventing managers from 
entrenching themselves.  Under the well-known Unocal test, managers can 
use defensive tactics but only to an extent that is “reasonable in relation to 
the threat posed.”6  Allowing managers to maintain a pill as long as they are 
in office, courts have believed, is a proportionate measure because of the 
availability of the proxy contest safety valve.  Our analysis shows, however, 
that this safety valve on which courts have relied is largely illusory against 
companies with an ESB.   
Accordingly, when a target has an ESB (which is approximately half the 
time), courts applying the proportionality test should not permit managers to 
maintain a pill after they lose one election conducted over an acquisition 
offer.  Allowing managers to maintain a pill after what was essentially a 
referendum on the offer would be a disproportionate and substantially 
entrenching measure.  Therefore, we argue, preventing the use of a pill-ESB 
combination following defeat in one election would be consistent with the 
proportionality test put forward by Unocal and subsequently by Moran.  In 
addition, our approach would preserve the nontakeover benefits that are 
often cited to justify staggered boards—board stability and board 
independence—while ensuring that staggered boards are not unduly used to 
defeat offers that enjoy shareholder support. 
The remainder of this Paper proceeds as follows.  Part II provides the 
necessary background: an account of the widespread use of staggered 
boards, the justifications offered for them, and the rising shareholder 
resistance to them.  Part III offers our theory of staggered boards and 
demonstrates why, at a theoretical level, ESBs are very powerful against 
hostile takeover bids, more powerful than has been recognized.  Part IV 
provides empirical evidence that supports this theory.  Part V examines how 
this state of affairs came about and documents that the large majority of ESBs 
had been adopted before shareholders could have recognized the 
antitakeover significance that ESBs would obtain as a result of subsequent 
judicial and legislative developments.  Part VI discusses the policy 
implications of our analysis and makes recommendations that would 








A.  The Law of Staggered Boards 
 
The default law in all states requires that all directors stand for election at 
each annual shareholder meeting.7  However, all states provide an 
exemption from this requirement if the board is staggered.8  In a company 
with a staggered board, directors are grouped into classes (typically three), 
with each class elected at successive annual meetings.  For example, a board 
with twelve directors might be grouped into three classes, with four directors 
standing at the 2001 annual meeting, four more directors standing for 
reelection in 2002, and the remaining four directors standing for reelection in 
2003.9  With three classes, directors in each class would be elected to three-
year terms.   
Thirty-nine jurisdictions, including Delaware and California, permit a 
maximum of three classes.10  New York permits as many as four classes of 
directors,11 and Arizona allows three “or to the extent not inconsistent with 
cumulative voting rights, more.”12  Ten other states have not addressed this 
issue.13 
 
7. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2000); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03(d) 
(1999).  Moreover, if the corporation does not hold an annual shareholder meeting 
within thirteen months (in Delaware) or fifteen months (under the Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act, or the RMBCA) of  the last meeting, a court may order an 
annual meeting on the petition of any stockholder or director.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 211(c) (2000); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.03(a)(1) (1999). 
8. See GRANT A. GARTMAN & JACK D. ISAACS, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH 
CENTER, CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE  STATE BY STATE: A GUIDE TO SELECTED  STATUTES 
(1998). 
9. While Delaware does not require the classes to be roughly equal in number, the 
RMBCA does.  Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2000), with MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 8.06 (1999).  However, regardless of whether required or not by statute, most 
companies that install a staggered board impose this requirement on themselves, 
perhaps because by doing so they maximize the antitakeover protection of the SB.  See, 
e.g., Bestfoods Restated Certificate of Incorporation § 11(8) (requiring the same number 
of directors in each class, “as nearly as may be possible”).  But see ARV Assisted Living 
Bylaws § 3.3 (allowing the board to determine without restriction the number of 
directors in each class). 
10. See Richard H. Koppes, Lyle G. Ganske & Charles T. Haag, Corporate Governance 
Out of Focus: The Debate Over Classified Boards, 54 BUS. LAW. 1023, 1029 n.21 (1999). 
11. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 704(a) (McKinney 2001). 
12. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-806 (West 1996). 
13. See Koppes, Ganske & Haag, supra note 10, at 1029 n.21.  
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Delaware allows an SB to be specified either in the charter or in the 
bylaws,14 while the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA) only 
provides for an SB to be specified in the charter.15  In all states, installing an 
SB through charter amendment requires both shareholder approval and 
board approval,16 while installing an SB in the bylaws requires either 
shareholder approval or board approval.17  Conversely, dismantling an SB 
that is in the charter requires both a shareholder vote and a board vote, while 
dismantling an SB in the bylaws can be done either through shareholder vote 
or through board vote.  Thus, while SBs have the same (direct) effect whether 
installed through the charter or through the bylaws, SBs in the bylaws are 
generally much easier to dismantle.18   
If an SB is installed in the charter, directors may only be removed for 
cause, and shareholders may not “pack the board” by increasing the number 
of directors and filling the vacancies created, then we characterize the SB as 
an “effective staggered board” (ESB)—one that cannot be dismantled by a 
hostile bidder without first winning control of the board.19  As we shall see 
below, the distinction between an SB and an ESB is irrelevant for two of the 
arguments put forward to explain SBs—board stability and board 
 
14. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2000). 
15. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.06 (1999). 
16. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1)-(2); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03 
(1999) (requiring board approval and shareholder approval for all but minor changes to 
the charter). 
17. Delaware requires that the charter expressly provide for board authority to 
amend the bylaws, while the RMBCA reverses this default rule, allowing the board to 
amend the bylaws unless otherwise specified in the charter.  Compare DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 109(a) (2000), with MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20 (1999).  Both corporate codes 
and all states allow shareholders to amend the bylaws.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
109(a) (2000); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20(b) (1999). 
18. A staggered board specified in the bylaws might be as difficult to dismantle as a 
staggered board specified in the charter if the charter specifies that the board must 
approve any modifications to board structure, effectively making the staggered board 
provision in the bylaws equivalent to a charter provision.  See, e.g., Articles of 
Incorporation and By-Laws of Quality Dining, Inc. (requiring board approval for “any 
elimination or modification of the groups or terms of office of the Directors as the By-
Laws then in effect may provide”).  In addition, a supermajority voting requirement for 
shareholder bylaw amendments may make a staggered board in the bylaws equivalent 
to a charter provision, which can be such a hurdle to dismantling as to be practically 
akin to an outright ban.  See, e.g., Circon By-Laws (requiring a two-thirds vote for any 
shareholder amendments to the bylaws); see also infra note 99 (discussing the effect of a 
supermajority amendment requirement in preserving a staggered board installed in the 
bylaws of the takeover bid for Circon). 
19. See Coates, supra note 2.  
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independence—but becomes highly relevant for the third (and we believe 
most important) reason for SBs, to make hostile takeovers more difficult.  We 
therefore make this distinction between SBs and ESBs throughout the 
remainder of this Paper. 
 
B.     The Proliferation of Staggered Boards 
 
Though staggered boards have been a part of the corporate law landscape 
for decades,20 they gained popularity during the 1980s takeover wave.   
Today, among a sample of 2,421 large public U.S.  companies, 59% have 
staggered boards.21  In addition, there was a dramatic increase in staggered 
board incidence among companies going public in 1991-92 (34%) versus 
1999-2000 (82%).22  The IPO statistics suggest that, barring any major shifts in 
the legal or political environment, staggered board incidence will only 
increase further among major U.S.  corporations in the years to come. 
Figure 1 shows that SBs are represented broadly across industries:23 
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20. Among the approximately 2500 companies in the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC) database, the first staggered board appeared in the company 
now known as Equifax in 1920.  See sources cites supra note 1. 
21. The sample comes from the 1993 and 1998 volumes of the IRRC Corporate 
Takeover Defenses databooks, which include all firms in the S&P 1500 plus additional 
firms “selected primarily on the basis of market capitalization and high institutional 
ownership.”  ROSENBAUM, supra note 1, at ix. 
22. See Coates, supra note 2, at 1353, 1376. 
23. The construction of these industry classifications comes from George P. Baker & 
Guhan Subramanian, The Global Market for Corporate Control (unpublished data, on 
file with the authors).  
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Figure 1 shows no pronounced industry effect for staggered board 
incidence.  In all industries except Transportation and Communications, 
staggered boards appear in the majority of firms, and in two industries—
Construction and Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services—staggered board 
incidence is 70% and higher. 
Figure 2 shows staggered board incidence by firm size: 
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Figure 2 shows that staggered boards are well represented across 
companies of varying sizes.  The only statistically significant difference 
occurs at the low-end of the spectrum, where staggered boards are slightly 
under-represented.  This finding is consistent with evidence from one of us 
that staggered boards were less common at smaller IPO firms in the 1990s, 
controlling for insider ownership.24  One possible explanation is that smaller 
firms may be advised by lawyers with less takeover experience, who are less 
likely to install staggered boards.25 
 
C.     Justifications for Staggered Boards 
 
1.  Nontakeover justifications. 
 
Two nontakeover-related justifications have been put forward to justify 
staggered boards.  First, they facilitate the independence of outside 
directors.26 Independent directors, goes this argument, will be less influenced 
by executives if they have a term of three years rather than one year.  Second, 
they reduce annual turnover on the board, thereby promoting board 
 
24. See Coates, supra note 2, at 1371, tbl. 6. 
25. See id. at 1360-64 (finding that outside counsel are often responsible for choosing 
takeover defenses). 
26. See, e.g., Koppes, Ganske & Haag, supra note 10, at 1053-54.  
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stability.27  It is generally good, goes the argument, to always have some 
experienced and seasoned directors, who have the perspective that only time 
on the board can provide.  If the board were not staggered, there is in theory 
some chance that all board members in a given year will be rookies.  A 
staggered board prevents this outcome by ensuring that at most one-third of 
the board members will be new.28 
However, a staggered board imposed through the charter is an 
unnecessarily blunt instrument to achieve these two benefits.  On board 
independence, a bylaw establishing a staggered board would be sufficient to 
provide independent directors autonomy from management so that they 
could effectively monitor.  Because officers cannot amend the bylaws 
without approval of a majority of the whole board, a majority-independent 
board would not be de-staggered against the will of the independent 
directors.29  A bylaw would thus accomplish the independence goal without, 
as will be made clear below, in any way impeding a hostile bidder.30 
 
27. See id. at 1051-52. 
28. See, e.g., Avant Corporation Proxy Statement, Proposal No. 2 (April 7, 1998) 
(advocating a staggered board because classification “will help lend continuity and 
stability to the management of the Company”); Cornell Corrections Proxy Statement 
(March 9, 1998) (advocating staggered board “to promote continuity and stability”); 
Rental Service Corp. Proxy Statement, Proposal No. 2 (March 30, 1998) (same). 
29. Even at the minority of public companies that lack a majority of independent 
directors, it would be controversial and reputationally costly for officers to de-stagger 
the board against the will of the independent directors.  An independent director would 
not expect that, if he or she were to display independence, insiders would amend the 
bylaws to cut short the term of the independent director. 
30. Although the RMBCA requires a staggered board to be in the charter, most 
states do not seem to follow the RMBCA on this point. In addition, Delaware permits a 
staggered board to be specified in either the charter or the bylaws, and 50% of all public 
companies are incorporated in Delaware. See  Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of 
Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice in the 1990s: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and 
Antitakeover Overreaching, U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 17, fig. 2, on 
file with authors); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to 
Incorporate,  (Harvard Olin Discussion Paper No. 352, 2002), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=296492; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and 
Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence favor State Competition in Corporate Law? CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at Table 2).  In the small number of states which require 
a staggered board to be specified in the charter, we believe that both board stability and 
board independence could be achieved through a convention or policy (e.g., that the 
slate should be two-thirds incumbent directors), which would avoid the antitakeover 
consequences of a staggered board specified in the charter.  Alternatively, a staggered 
board could be installed in the charter but shareholders could specifically be given the 
power to remove directors without cause, as suggested by Koppes, Ganske & Haag, 
supra note 10.  See infra Part III.C (discussing ways to avoid the antitakeover power of  
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Similarly, on board stability, a staggered board bylaw would achieve the 
goal of preventing excessive turnover, and even a company without a 
staggered board could have a convention or policy requiring that annual 
slates include at least two-thirds incumbent directors in the ordinary course 
of business.  Such a policy or bylaw would be followed in the normal course 
of events.31  As an empirical matter, even in companies that do not have any 
policy or rule against replacing more than one third of the board in any 
given year, such high turnover rarely, if ever, happens outside the change of 
control context.32  In the normal course of business, most of the candidates 
running on the insiders’ slate are usually those who are already serving on 
the board.  Thus a convention, policy, or bylaw should provide the desired 
board independence and board stability in the normal course of events in a 
more focused way than a staggered board. 
Of course, in one situation a convention, policy, or bylaw would be 
insufficient—in the case of a hostile change of control.  When a buyer 
acquires a controlling interest, it would be natural for it to replace the 
directors with a new slate of directors, assuming that it were not stopped by 
the charter.  Thus, alternatives that stop short of a charter amendment would 
not likely prevail in the case of a hostile takeover. 
But a desire for board stability no longer makes sense in the case of a 
hostile change of control.  The argument for continuity presupposes that 
there is some team working largely in harmony, and that such a team would 
benefit from retaining a majority of experienced members from whom new 
members could and would be willing to learn.  But in the case of a hostile 
takeover, old and new directors are not going to form a harmonious team.33  
In such a case, board stability indeed might be quite harmful.  In fact, 
arguments for board stability, through “dead hand” and “no hand” pills, 
 
SBs). 
31. Observe, for example, that many companies (such as Boeing and GE) follow 
policies mandating a certain retirement age for the CEO, even in companies with 
successful and powerful CEOs.  It would seem that to retire a CEO at 65 would require a 
stronger commitment device than is needed to retire only part of the directors, yet we 
know of no such policies that are written in to the bylaws or charter. 
32. See, e.g., Rental Services Corp. Proxy Statement, Proposal No. 2 (March 30, 1998) 
(acknowledging that “the Company has not yet experienced problems with respect to 
continuity,” but nevertheless advocating a staggered board “to provide continuity and 
stability to the Company’s management”). 
33. For a somewhat humorous illustration of this point, see Brian Hall, Christopher 
J. Rose & Guhan Subramanian, Circon (A) (Harvard Business School Case Study N9-
801-403) (describing how dissident director General Victor Krulak reportedly asks 
fellow dissident Charles Elson to call him by his nickname, Brute, but then introduces 
himself to the incumbent directors with:  “This is General Krulak.”).  
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have already been rejected by the Delaware Chancery Court34 and the 
Delaware Supreme Court.35  Thus charter-based staggered boards are over-
encompassing because they provide board stability when business 
justification and support in the Delaware case law are both at their weakest.36 
 
2.  Antitakeover justifications. 
 
The third reason often given to explain staggered boards is that they 
make hostile takeovers more difficult.37  For reasons we discuss in Part V, 
this justification may have been unintended when staggered boards first 
appeared, but the key point is that the interaction between a staggered board 
and a poison pill puts up a potent defense against a hostile bidder.  A pill 
provides relatively weak takeover protection if the target is vulnerable to a 
rapid proxy fight, because the target’s board can redeem the pill at any time; 
a staggered board without a pill is likewise ineffective against a bid, given 
the unlikelihood that target directors will continue to resist if a bidder has 
acquired a majority of the target’s stock.  In combination with an effective 
staggered board, however, a pill provides significant antitakeover protection: 
the pill blocks any stock acquisition beyond the trigger level, and the 
 
34. See Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc. 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. 1998) (ruling that claim 
challenging dead hand pill survives motion to dismiss). 
35. See  Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998) 
(invalidating slow hand pill); see also Bank of New York v. Irving Bank, 528 N.Y.S.2d 
482, 485-86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (invalidating dead hand pill under New York law). 
36. See, e.g., Topps Co. Proxy Statement, Proposal No. 4 (May 28, 1998) (shareholder 
proposal to remove a staggered board because “in the unlikely event that stockholders 
vote to replace all directors, this decision would express stockholder dissatisfaction with 
the incumbent directors and reflect the need for change”); Bausch & Lomb Proxy 
Statement, Shareholder Proposal No. 2 (Mar. 19, 1998) (same). 
37. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Proxy Statement (Mar. 19, 1998) (arguing, in the fifth of 
five points in favor of a staggered board, that it “inhibits unfriendly take-over 
attempts”); Rental Service Corp. Proxy Statement, Proposal No. 2 (Mar. 30, 1998) 
(acknowledging that the installation of a staggered board “may have potential 
antitakeover effects”).  Many management statements against staggered board 
rescission, or in favor of new staggered boards, argue that this antitakeover effect gives 
management greater bargaining power.  See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb Proxy Statement, 
Shareholder Proposal No. 2 (Mar. 19, 1998) (“The classified board does not preclude 
unsolicited acquisition proposals but, by eliminating the threat of imminent removal, 
puts the incumbent Board in a position to act to maximize value to all shareholders.”); 
Bristol Myers Squibb Proxy Statement, Proposal No. 3 (Mar. 16, 1998) (“One benefit 
derived from that situation is an enhancement of management’s ability to negotiate in 
the best interest of all stockholders with a person seeking to gain control of the 
corporation.”).  
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staggered board forces the bidder to go through two proxy contests in order 
to gain control of the board and redeem the pill.38 
Statistics on staggered board incidence are consistent with the view that 
staggered boards are at least partly motivated by antitakeover 
considerations.  As noted in Part II.B, staggered boards are relatively less 
common among smaller firms, where ownership is typically more 
concentrated and hostile takeovers may be more difficult or impossible (if 
insiders own a controlling stake).  Furthermore, staggered boards were far 
less common before the 1980s takeover wave,39 even though the board 
stability and board independence arguments (presumably) applied with 
equal force before 1980 as after.40   
 
D.     The Growing Opposition to Staggered Boards 
 
While SBs are commonplace among all types of U.S.  public companies, 
very few SBs have been proposed by management and approved by 
shareholders since 1990.  The reason is simple:  Shareholders have stopped 
voting in favor of new staggered boards.  The emergence of shareholder 
activism in the early 1990s, combined with important changes in the 
Delaware case law around the same time,41 made institutional investors 
acutely aware of the potential for managerial entrenchment behind an 
SB/pill combination.  As a result, their support for staggered boards largely 
vanished, and companies that did not already have their staggered boards in 
place by 1990 had missed the party.  Among companies covered by the 
IRRC, management proposals to classify boards dropped from 88 proposals 
in 1986 to just ten proposals in 2000.42  Of these ten, only four involved 
companies in which management did not own a controlling stake; among 
 
38. See, e.g., Federated Department Stores Proxy Statement, Proposal No. 3 (Apr. 16, 
1998) (“The Company’s outside advisors have informed the Company that they 
continue to believe that classified directorate terms are important to ensure the efficacy 
of stockholder rights plans.”). 
39. See infra Figure 5. 
40. Note also that staggered boards are much less common in the United Kingdom, 
where they are less useful as antitakeover devices without the accompanying 
jurisprudence in support of the poison pill.  Again, the board stability and board 
independence arguments would seem to apply with equal force in the United Kingdom 
as in the United States, yet staggered board incidence in the United Kingdom is much 
lower. 
41. See infra Part V. 
42. See  Michael Klausner, Institutional Shareholders’ Split Personality on Corporate 
Governance: Active in Proxies, Passive in IPOs 3 tbl. 1 (Stanford Law School, Working 
Paper No. 255, November 2001).  
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these four, only one was successful.43 
In fact, activist shareholders began trying to turn back the tide by 
proposing resolutions to de-stagger boards.  These proposals, along with 
proposals to redeem pills, were increasingly popular with shareholders 
during the 1990s,44 although they have no binding effect and therefore have 
been routinely ignored by managers.  The average shareholder vote in favor 
of proposals to de-stagger the board increased from 16.4% in 1987 to 52.7% in 
2000.45  One of us in other work has speculated that these proposals would 
garner even greater support were they binding on boards.46 
The experience at Bausch & Lomb is typical.  In 1997, shareholder activist 
William Steiner from the Investor Rights Association of America sponsored a 
proposal urging the board to de-stagger itself: 
[T]he Company’s classified Board of Directors maintains the 
incumbency of the current Board and therefore of current 
management, which in turn limits management’s accountability to 
stockholders. . . .  I believe that [de-staggering the board] is one of the 
best methods available to the stockholder to insure that the Company 
will be managed in a manner that is in the best interests of the 
stockholders.47 
The Bausch & Lomb board of directors argued against the proposal: 
The Board stated in the proxy statement relating to that meeting 
[approving the staggered board] its belief that the amendment would 
reduce the vulnerability of the Company to certain potentially abusive 
takeover tactics and encourage potential acquirers to negotiate with 
the Board.  The Board also stated its belief that the amendment 
assures continuity and stability of the Company's management and 
policies, since a majority of the directors at any given time have prior 
experience as directors of the Company. 
In the opinion of the Board, the above reasons continue to be valid 
and the staggered Board remains in the best interests of the 
shareholders. . . .  The staggered board does not preclude unsolicited 
acquisition proposals but, by eliminating the threat of imminent 
 
43. See id. at 4. 
44. See  John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How 
Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 861 tbl. 5 (1999) (measuring 
the steady increase in shareholder votes for precatory resolutions to redeem the poison 
pill and de-stagger the board). 
45. See Klausner, supra note 42, at 3 tbl. 1. 
46. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and 
Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 127-128 (2001). 
47. Written Statement of William Steiner, Bausch & Lomb Proxy Statement, 
Shareholder Proposal No. 2 (Dec. 28, 1996).  
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removal, puts the incumbent Board in a position to act to maximize 
value to all shareholders.  In addition, the Board does not believe that 
directors elected for staggered terms are any less accountable to 
shareholders than they would be if elected annually, since the same 
standards of performance apply regardless of the term of service.48 
The Steiner proposal received 62% approval from Bausch & Lomb 
shareholders, yet the company continued to maintain a staggered board.49 
 
E.     Conventional Wisdom on Staggered Boards 
 
Thus far in this Part we have argued that the motivation for installing 
staggered boards, as well as the motivation for shareholder activism against 
them, comes from their potential antitakeover consequences.  These 
antitakeover consequences are the focus of this Paper; our thesis is that they 
are greater than has previously been recognized.  Although most scholars 
and practitioners recognize that staggered boards have some antitakeover 
effect, the conventional wisdom is that the magnitude of this effect is not 
very large.   
We interviewed fifteen senior partners from major law firms in New York 
City and Wilmington, Delaware and found consensus around the view that 
targets, once in play, will generally trade to either the initial bidder or to a 
white knight.50  When presenting drafts of this Paper, we also surveyed 
M&A practitioners and corporate law academics to get their quantitative 
assessment of the impact of staggered boards on bid outcomes.51  Among 
 
48. See Written Statement of Bausch & Lomb Board of Directors, Bausch & Lomb 
Proxy Statement, Shareholder Proposal No. 2 (Dec. 28, 1996). 
49. See Bausch & Lomb Votes by Shareholders Go Against Management, WALL ST. J. 
(April 30, 1997) at B7 (reporting 28 million shares voted in favor of one-year terms, 17 
million shares voted opposed, and 0.3 million abstentions).  
50. Selected comments are illustrative:  “Once somebody starts, and commits to the 
deal, the ego of the CEO, etc., generally drive it to completion. . . .  Like everything else, 
it’s the price that determines whether or not the deal is successful.”  “Given that the 
target is put into play, it’s likely to go.  If a bidder is willing to pay, it will succeed.  If it 
is not willing to pay, someone else will come along.”  This conventional wisdom seems 
to hold among bankers (“Bankers will come to you and say, ‘Life will now change for 
you—either you will be bought by [the hostile bidder] or you will be bought by 
someone else.’”) and gets transmitted to clients (“Our investment bankers and 
everybody told us that once a hostile bid is made, 80% are successful.  So we 
assumed . . . that we were going to be taken over one way or another.”). 
51. Before the presentation, each participant was asked to answer two questions:  
(1) what is the overall likelihood of a target remaining independent once a hostile bid 
has been made; and (2) what is the likelihood of a target remaining independent once a 
hostile bid has been made if the target has an effective (non-evadable) staggered board?   
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M&A lawyers, the mean estimate for likelihood of remaining independent 
increased by only 5% when the target had an effective staggered board.52  
Among corporate law academics, the mean estimate for the likelihood of 
remaining independent increased by 9%.53  As we will show in Part IV, the 
actual effect is several times larger than these estimates.  The business press 
also holds the view that the presence or absence of a staggered board is 
relatively unimportant.54 
However, it is important to note that our main thesis in this Paper does 
not depend on the above account of the conventional view.  We plan to study 
more rigorously in other work the extent to which this view exists, and, if 
widespread, what are the sources of the misperception that sophisticated 
parties seem to have adopted.  In this Paper, however, we focus on showing 
that staggered boards have a powerful antitakeover effect and on identifying 
the sources of this effect.  This analysis and its conclusions do not depend on 
whether market participants have or have not fully recognized the 
significance of staggered boards.   
 
III. THE SPECIAL ANTITAKEOVER POWER OF STAGGERED BOARDS 
 
In Part II we showed that staggered boards are an important part of the 
corporate landscape today.  We also argued that the standard non-takeover 
related justifications for staggered boards (board independence and board 
stability) are relatively weak, and that the empirical evidence on staggered 
board incidence is most consistent with the view that staggered boards are 
motivated primarily by antitakeover reasons.  In this Part we develop a 
theory demonstrating that staggered boards are in fact extremely potent as 
an antitakeover device.  In the next Part we provide large-sample empirical 
evidence in support of this theory. 
 
Each respondent individually wrote his or her response on a note card without 
discussion.  Respondents only identified whether they were an academic or a 
practitioner.  Responses were tabulated anonymously and reported back to the group.  
Respondents did not know they would be asked to answer these questions when they 
arrived at the seminar. 
52. The mean estimate among practitioners increased from 12% (independence rate 
against bids for targets overall) to 17%. 
53. The mean estimate among corporate law academics increased from 38% to 47%. 
54. See, e.g., Avrum D. Lank, Hostile Takeover Attempts Force Investors to Make Tough 
Decisions, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 11, 1998, at Business 2 (“Only infrequently does 
a company put in play by a hostile takeover offer emerge intact.”); Anita Raghavan, In 
Europe, a New Storm over Takeover Rules, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2000, at A21 (“In the case of 
unsolicited, hostile offers, most boards ultimately cave in to shareholder pressure and 
dismantle their antitakeover defenses.”).  
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Parts III.A and III.B provide a brief chronology of the important Delaware 
case law, noting the dramatic changes brought about by the arrival of the 
poison pill in 1984.  Part III.C summarizes the existing regime and identifies 
the three types of targets that now exist.  Part III.D analyzes the “delay 
problem” and demonstrates that ESBs impose even more delay on bidders 
than alternative regimes, currently not permitted, which would allow 
biennial or triennial election of a single class of directors.  Part III.E focuses 
on the “two-election problem” to show that the potency of an ESB against a 
hostile bid goes beyond delay.  We conclude from this analysis that the ballot 
box safety valve, which Delaware courts relied on so heavily in the 
development of their takeover jurisprudence over the past two decades, is 
rendered virtually ineffective against an ESB target. 
 
A.  Before the Pill 
 
Even before the pill, a staggered board was considered to be a defense, 
though a rather weak one.55  Basically a staggered board would delay a 
bidder’s ability to take control of the board until two annual elections were 
over, even if the bidder owned a majority of the shares through a successful 
tender offer.  This outcome would make the hostile acquisition of a control 
block less desirable, because capturing the benefits of control would be 
delayed for as long as two years. 
The pre-pill staggered board was nevertheless weak, for several reasons.  
First, a staggered board did not prevent a bidder from acquiring a 
controlling block and creating a situation in which, albeit with some delay, it 
would definitely gain control.  Thus the staggered board did not impede the 
acquisition of a controlling block; it only delayed the ability of the buyer to 
exercise its voting power.  Put differently, a bidder who needed to know 
(say, for strategic planning purposes) whether it would be able to gain 
control of Company X could find out the answer without delay.  At most, the 
realization of that control would be delayed, but it would be inevitable. 
Second, it was generally believed that, if a bidder were to acquire a 
majority of the shares of a company with a staggered board, it would not in 
fact take the buyer two elections to gain control of the board because the 
board could be expected to resign.56  There were two reasons for this 
 
55. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 576 (1986) (listing SBs as takeover 
defenses but characterizing them as fairly weak); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach 
to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 
(1981). 
56. See CLARK, supra note 55, at 576 (“In practice, of course, the incumbent directors 
would often find it in their interest to come to terms with the new controlling 
shareholder.”); Gilson, supra note 55.  
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prediction.  First, the board would have little legitimacy continuing to serve 
when the majority shareholder clearly did not wish it to stay.  Staying would 
likely hurt the personal reputations of the board members.  Second, this 
reputational cost would come with little benefit because eventually losing 
independence was a certainty and because an incumbent board could 
accomplish little against the will of a controlling shareholder.  At best, 
incumbent directors could hang on for a bit longer, delaying the ability of a 
majority shareholder to use freely its impending control position.  All of this 
made mass resignation a highly likely scenario. 
 
B.     Enter the Pill 
 
The pill dramatically changed how quickly a board could be replaced by 
shareholders.  In the era of the pill, a potential buyer would need an election 
not to use the voting power of the block it had already acquired, but rather to 
buy the block in the first place.  Pills made staggered boards important. 
 
1.  The pill and the power to keep it. 
 
Poison pills57 consist of stock warrants or rights that allow the holder to 
buy an acquirer’s stock (a so-called “flip over” provision), the target’s stock 
(a “flip in” provision), or both at a substantial discount from the market 
price.  These rights only become exercisable in the event that a shareholder 
(the “acquiring person”) buys more than a certain percentage of the target’s 
stock (typically 10 or 15%) without the target board’s approval.58  These 
rights are explicitly not exercisable by the acquiring person, so the resulting 
dilution in his voting power and economic stake may make the acquisition of 
the target through market purchases too expensive to pursue.  Although in 
theory a hostile bidder could “break through” a poison pill by triggering it, 
suffering the resulting dilution, and continuing to buy shares, no bidder has 
ever done so in our fifteen-plus years of experience with the pill.59  In 
 
57. Throughout, “pill” or “poison pill” means a standard poison pill, which permits 
redemption by the target board, however constituted, at any time.  We treat separately 
pills that attempt to interfere with proxy fights and/or a target board’s ability to redeem 
the pill (so-called “dead hand” or “slow hand” pills). 
58. For a description of the common features of a poison pill, see Wachtell, Lipton, 
Rosen & Katz, The Share Purchase Rights Plan, reprinted in RONALD  J. GILSON  & 
BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 10-18 (2d ed.  
Supp. 1999).  For a description of how a pill is implemented, see John C. Coates IV, 
Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 271, 287 n.62 (2000). 
59. Sir James Goldsmith threatened to trigger Crown Zellerbach’s pill in his hostile  
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practice, then, the pill provides an impenetrable barrier to control 
acquisitions.  As long as the pill remains in place, no other defensive 
measures are necessary because the bid is completely blocked.  Defensive 
measures might be needed, at most, to protect the pill itself. 
Protecting the pill, however, is not as easy as it might seem because at 
any time a pill can be redeemed by the target’s board.  This provision allows 
the target board to permit a friendly bidder to proceed, but it also allows a 
hostile bidder to redeem the pill and proceed with its own bid if it can gain 
control of the target’s board.  Efforts to cut off this line of attack by making 
pills nonredeemable (“no hand” provisions), allowing only continuing 
directors to redeem the pill (“dead hand” provisions), or delaying 
redemption for a specified time after a change in board composition (“slow 
hand” provisions) were invalidated by a New York court in the 1980s and by 
the Delaware courts in the late 1990s,60 although these pills have been 
legalized in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Georgia.61  Thus, at the turn of the 
millennium, the pill remains vulnerable to a successful proxy attack at the 
vast majority of public companies. 
Moran v. Household International, decided in 1985,62 was the seminal case 
upholding the poison pill.  The Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the 
business judgment rule applied to Household’s decision to adopt a poison 
pill but was careful to state that the right to use a pill was not “absolute”:  
“When the Household Board of Directors is faced with a tender offer and a 
request to redeem the Rights, they will not be able to arbitrarily reject the 
offer.”63  The court went on to explain that managerial decisions to redeem 
the pill when faced with a tender offer would be subject to judicial scrutiny 
under Unocal.64 
 
bid for that company.  The threat was sufficiently credible that Crown Zellerbach 
negotiated a friendly deal with Goldsmith.  See Mike Tharp, Goldsmith Wins Fight for 
Crown Zellerbach Corp., WALL ST. J., July 26, 1985, at 3.  This bid was cited in Moran as 
evidence that the pill was not impermeable.  However, both the Crown Zellerbach pill 
and the Moran pill only had “flip over” triggers, not the more potent “flip in” triggers 
that soon became commonplace. 
60. See cases cited supra notes 34-35. 
61. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-201(c)(2)(ii) (2000) (allowing directors 
to limit the power of future directors to vote for redemption, modification, or 
termination of shareholder rights plans for up to 180 days); Invacare Corp. v. 
Healthdyne Tech., 968 F. Supp. 1578, (N.D. Ga. 1997) (upholding dead-hand pill under 
Georgia law); AMP v. Allied Signal, No. 98-4405, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15617, at *34-35 
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 1998) (upholding slow hand pill under Pennsylvania law). 
62. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
63. Id. at 1354. 
64. Id. (referring to Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)).  
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Three years later, in City Capital Associates v. Interco Inc.,65 Chancellor 
William Allen held that a pill being used by the incumbent board to resist a 
noncoercive tender offer had to be redeemed.  The use of the pill to defeat 
the offer, Chancellor Allen concluded, was not proportionate to any 
legitimate threat posed by the tender offer.  A year later, in Paramount 
Communications v. Time,66 the Delaware Supreme Court explicitly rejected 
Chancellor Allen’s approach in Interco and seemed to suggest instead that 
the right to reject a hostile bid was close to absolute, at least in some 
circumstances:  “Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately 
conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is 
clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.”67   
The Court found that Time’s characterization of Paramount’s all-cash, 
100% tender offer as “inadequate” was sufficient basis for Time to pursue its 
acquisition of Warner and thus (given Paramount’s unwillingness or 
inability to bid for a combined Time-Warner) to deny Time shareholders the 
opportunity to decide for themselves whether Paramount’s bid was 
inadequate.  While Delaware jurisprudence does not say that courts will 
never order the redemption of a poison pill, there has not been since Time a 
single case in which redemption of a pill was ordered by a Delaware court.  
Thus, as a practical matter, a bidder has had to assume in planning a bid that 
a target could “Just Say No” and retain a pill unless and until the bidder 
obtained majority control of the target’s board. 
Moore v. Wallace Computer68 illustrates how far the “Just Say No” defense 
can go under current Delaware law.  Here, the federal district court for 
Delaware, applying Unocal in the wake of Unitrin,69 held that the Wallace 
Computer board would receive the protection of the business judgment rule 
in its “Just Say No” defense against Moore’s hostile bid.  Applying the two-
pronged enhanced scrutiny test set out in Unocal, the court first found that 
the Moore offer posed a threat to Wallace because Wallace shareholders 
“might tender their shares in ignorance or mistaken belief as to 
 
65. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); cf. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & 
Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986) (striking down takeover defenses under Unocal); 
Grand Metropolitan Public Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988) (same). 
66. 571 A.2d. 1140 (Del. 1989). 
67. 571 A.2d at 1154 (emphasis added).  As some commentators have observed, 
however, the Court in Paramount v. Time expressly noted that Paramount (the bidder) 
had not raised, and the court was thus not addressing, the question of whether Time 
(the target) could be required to redeem its poison pill in the face of Paramount’s offer. 
68. 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995). 
69. Unitrin v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).  
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management’s representations of intrinsic value and future expectations.”70  
Applying the second prong of the enhanced scrutiny test, the court went on 
to approve Wallace’s refusal to redeem its poison pill, on the grounds that 
such defensive tactics were reasonable because they were proportionate to 
the threat from Moore and “not draconian.”71 
The district court’s decision in Wallace Computer represents a logical 
extension of Time—one would be hard-pressed to find a meaningful 
distinction in the abstract between a corporate strategy that involves a 
strategic merger (Time) and a corporate strategy that involves internal 
growth (Wallace).  Yet the court’s willingness to accept the “shareholder 
ignorance” argument seems to represent an important extension of “Just Say 
No.”72  While there may be alternative policy grounds to uphold the “Just 
Say No” defense, the Wallace court passed on the opportunity to set fiduciary 
duty constraints on how a target board deploys a pill.  If these limits exist, 
Wallace suggests that they have moved well beyond their cautious origins in 
Moran.73 
 
2.  The ballot box safety valve. 
 
In developing the jurisprudence that today allows a target board to 
maintain the pill indefinitely, the Delaware courts relied explicitly on there 
being a safety valve against managerial abuse through the shareholder 
franchise.  Because shareholders can replace the board, if the board were to 
sacrifice shareholder interests by maintaining the pill, the bidder or someone 
else (e.g., an arbitrageur) could run a proxy contest promising to elect a 
board that would redeem the pill and clear the way for the acquisition 
desired by shareholders.  Indeed, the Delaware courts, at the same time that 
they seemed to be giving license to boards to maintain the pill indefinitely 
and otherwise block a bid, also indicated that they would protect against 
managerial moves to impede voting by shareholders to remove them.74 
 
70. Wallace Computer, 907 F. Supp. at 1557.  It is possible that Delaware state courts 
might decline to follow the federal court’s holding in Wallace Computer, but they have 
yet to do so or to repudiate the “Just Say No” case in dicta. 
71. Id. at 1563. 
72. See Neil C. Rifkind, Should Uninformed Shareholders Be a Threat Justifying Defensive 
Action by Target Directors in Delaware?: “Just Say No” After Moore v. Wallace, 78 B. U. L. 
REV. 105 (1998). 
73. Cf.  Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and 
Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffet, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511 (1997). 
74. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373.  
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The seminal case on this point is Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.75  In 
Blasius, the hostile bidder, Atlas, solicited written consents to increase the 
size of the Blasius board from seven to fifteen members, as well as to elect 
eight new members nominated by Atlas.  In response, the Blasius board met 
through conference call and voted to increase the size of the board by two 
(thus making seven directors no longer sufficient for control).  While 
refusing to adopt a per se rule against such conduct, Chancellor Allen 
invalidated the Blasius board-packing action on the ground that it violated 
the shareholders’ fundamental right to elect directors:  “The shareholder 
franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of 
directorial power rests.”76  Blasius illustrates how the Delaware courts will 
protect the proxy contest route, because this route provides the basis for the 
courts’ deference to target managers in their use of structural defenses. 
In the current legal regime, then, if the board wants to maintain the pill 
and not sell to a hostile bidder, the only way to gain control passes through 
the ballot box.  The bidder will have to replace the board with one willing to 
redeem the pill.  Such a ballot box victory is required for a bidder whose 
offer is attractive to shareholders to overcome incumbents’ opposition.  
 
3.  The need for a ballot box safety valve. 
 
Before analyzing the viability of the ballot box safety valve, we pause to 
determine whether this safety valve is even necessary.  It might be argued 
that having the formal power to “Just Say No” does not mean that the board 
will use this power to prevent acquisitions that shareholders would like to 
have.  Instead, if market forces and compensation schemes sufficiently align 
the interests of managers and shareholders, managers might have sufficient 
incentives to avoid such results.  In particular, it might be argued that the 
carrot stemming from executive compensation schemes provides such 
incentives to managers.77  Most stock option packages vest immediately in 
the event of takeover, which may provide substantial gains to executives in 
the event of a premium acquisition; golden parachutes, too, can provide 
 
75. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988); see also Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del. 
1992). 
76. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659. 
77. See generally Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like 
Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 653 (1998)  (documenting the dramatic increase in U.S. stock 
option compensation in the 1990s); Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock, How I Learned to 
Stop Worrying and Love the Pill, forthcoming U. CHI. L. REV. (2002) (arguing that the 
increased use of stock options have reduced incumbents’ tendency to favor remaining 
independent).   
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extremely large side-payments to managers in the event of takeover.78  If 
stock options and parachutes are sufficiently large, managers would use 
defenses to gain bargaining power but in the end would prefer to sell rather 
than remain independent. 
Another reason that a safety valve might not be necessary is the presence 
of independent directors.  Even if the executives on the board wish to remain 
independent, goes the argument, other directors will not let them do so if 
accepting the bid would maximize shareholder value.  The independent 
directors will be willing to go along with saying no in order to get a higher 
price or to seek out a competitive alternative, but they will not agree to cause 
substantial harm to shareholders because that would hurt their reputation or 
would subject them to social or professional adverse consequences.79 
We agree that the carrot of stock options and golden parachutes and the 
potential stick supplied by independent directors may sometimes sufficiently 
align directors and managers with shareholders.  When this happens, we do 
not need a safety valve, because even absolute power to block bids would 
not be abused.  But our premise, as is the premise of Delaware law, is that it 
would be unwise to rely solely on these incentives to align the interests of 
managers and shareholders.80  Indeed, any inquiry that seeks to evaluate 
alternative takeover arrangements (short of an outright ban on takeovers) 
implicitly assumes that these arrangements matter, which is the case only if 
managers’ interests are not always aligned with those of shareholders.  While 
such coincidence might happen occasionally, or perhaps often, it is unlikely 
to happen always.  The takeover context in particular is one in which there is 
potential divergence between managers’ and shareholders’ interests.   
Furthermore, how often managers will do the right thing will depend on the 
consequences they face when they do not do the right thing.  A safety valve 
that operates well is important not only in cases in which it is actually used, 
but also in cases in which its presence influences managers to do the right 
thing on their own. 
We therefore proceed under the premise that a safety valve is necessary.  
 
78. See generally John C. Coates IV & Reinier Kraakman, Valuing Stock-Based 
Compensation: Executive Pay and Merger Activity in the 1990s (working paper, on file 
with the authors) (discussing the effect of options and parachutes on incentive to sell). 
79.C f .   Interview with partner at major Wilmington, Delaware law firm (Feb. 15, 
2001) (“What we [the bidder] want to do is put directors in an irreconcilable position, 
where they are not willing to sit around and take risks that implicate their fiduciary 
duty.”). 
80. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case against Veto Power in Corporate Takeovers, 
forthcoming U. CHI. L. REV. (2002) (arguing that managers’ and shareholders’ interests 
are likely to diverge significantly in the takeover context and that executive 
compensation schemes cannot be relied on to eliminate such agency problems).    
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In the remainder of this Part, however, we argue that the safety valve is 
illusory when the target has an ESB.  In the next Part we present empirical 
evidence in support of this view.  This theory and evidence is particularly 
troubling because courts have relied on the ballot box safety valve as if it 
were viable.  In Part V we discuss how the Delaware takeover jurisprudence 
should develop to bridge this gap between the theoretical role for the ballot 
box and its actual functioning. 
 
C.     Three Types of Targets 
 
We now begin addressing the question of whether and to what extent the 
ballot box is a viable safety valve.  The answer to this question, as we will 
show below, depends on the speed with which the bidder can gain access to 
the election mechanism.  Targets can be classified into three categories with 
respect to their vulnerability to a proxy contest:  no minimum term (NMT); 
effective annual term (EAT); and effective staggered board (ESB).  In this Part 
we describe each of these three categories in more detail.  In the next Part we 
examine the delay imposed on the proxy route for a hostile bidder facing 
targets in each of these categories. 
 
1.  No minimum term. 
 
Consider the scenario in which the target has a pill, but does not have any 
other structural defenses that would prevent the bidder from marshaling 
support from shareholders to replace the board immediately.  We classify 
these targets as no minimum term (NMT) targets.  To fit into this category, 
the target’s shareholders must have the ability to act by written consent81 or 
act through special meeting.82  In addition, the target’s shareholders must 
have the ability either (1) to remove directors without cause (and then 
petition the court to order a new election of directors);83 or (2) to “pack the 
 
81. Delaware firms may act through written consent unless prohibited in the firm’s 
charter or bylaws.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228(a) (2000).  Forty-two states that 
follow the RMBCA reverse this rule, allowing shareholders to act only through 
unanimous written consent (which effectively bars action through written consent).  See 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.04 (1999). 
82. Delaware firms are prohibited from calling a special meeting unless otherwise 
specified in their charter or bylaws.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (2000).  Forty-
one states that follow the RMBCA reverse this rule, allowing shareholders to call a 
special meeting on the call of 10% of the shareholders, unless prohibited at the firm 
level.  See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.02 (1999). 
83. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2000) (allowing removal of directors without 
cause unless there is a staggered board); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.08 (1999) (allowing  
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board” by increasing the number of directors and filling the vacancies 
created.84 
Against an NMT target, the bidder will announce its offer and run a 
proxy contest to replace the board, either through special meeting or through 
shareholder written consent.  If elected, the slate offered by the bidder will 
commit to withdrawing the pill and accepting the bidder’s offer.  The proxy 
contest, therefore, will essentially be a referendum on the offer.  Shareholders 
will vote in favor of the bidder’s team if and only if they view the bidder’s 
offer as superior to remaining independent. 
An NMT target produces a regime that can be referred to as one of 
“shareholder voting and no board veto.”85  The need to win a proxy contest 
eliminates the pressure to tender and thus ensures that no bidder whose 
offer does not enjoy genuine shareholder support can gain control.  Without 
the requirement of winning a vote, shareholders may tender to the hostile 
bidder, even if they do not judge the offer to be value maximizing, for fear of 
ending up with minority shares in the taken over target.86  The proxy contest 
eliminates this collective action problem, because shareholders will not be 
penalized if they vote against the bid and the bid is still approved.   
Therefore, shareholders will not vote in favor of the bid unless they want the 
bid to succeed.  The bidder will win the referendum only if a majority of the 
shareholders view the offered acquisition price as exceeding the target’s 
independent value, an “undistorted choice” that yields the socially optimal 
outcome.87 
In short, a proxy contest provides a viable safety valve in the specific 
context of an unstaggered board that can be removed immediately.  IBM’s 
 
removal without cause regardless of whether there is a staggered board); see also 
Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 3; Coates, supra note 2, at Appendix B. 
84. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b), § 142(e) (2000) (allowing number of directors to 
be set in either the by-laws or the charter and providing that the board shall fill 
vacancies unless otherwise provided for in the by-laws); MODEL  BUS. CORP. ACT § 
8.03(a), § 8.10(a) (1999) (allowing the number of directors to be set in either the by-laws 
or the charter and allowing either shareholders or the board to fill vacancies). 
85. See Bebchuk, supra note 80 (describing and defending the general case for such a 
regime).  
86. See  Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed 
Remedy, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 911 (1987); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice 
and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (1985). For a formal 
model of the pressure-to-tender problem and how voting can address it, see Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate 
Control (John M. Olin Center, Harvard Law School, Working Paper No. 336, October 
2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=290584.  
87. See sources cited supra note 86.  
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hostile bid for Lotus illustrates how this mechanism can work.  In June 1995, 
after months of friendly overtures, IBM launched a $60-per-share all-cash 
hostile bid for Lotus, representing more than a 100% premium over Lotus’s 
pre-bid share price (though only a slight premium to its 52-week high of 
$59.50).  IBM also solicited written consents from shareholders, as permitted 
by Delaware law,88 seeking to replace all six Lotus directors.  Lotus, 
meanwhile, declared the offer inadequate and searched for a white knight, 
reportedly approaching AT&T, Hewlett-Packard, and Intel.89   
On June 12, less than a week after IBM announced its offer, Lotus 
capitulated and agreed to a sweetened $64-per-share friendly deal.  The 
breathtaking pace of the deal, “one of the fastest capitulations ever in a 
hostile takeover,”90 occurred because IBM was able to force a shareholder 
referendum that it almost certainly would have won.  Thus, without any 
provisions that delay or complicate the election process, the pill does not 
enable managers to impede for very long an offer that shareholders find 
attractive.  As IBM/Lotus illustrates, the proxy contest safety valve works 
effectively when the board is not staggered and immediate removal is 
possible. 
 
2.  Effective annual term. 
 
Now consider a scenario in which the bidder cannot replace the target 
board immediately, but can do so at the next annual meeting of shareholders.  
We classify these targets as effective annual term (EAT) targets.  To fit into 
this category, the target must have eliminated the ability for shareholders to 
act by written consent and the ability to act at a special meeting or, 
alternatively, have both eliminated the power of shareholders to remove 
directors without cause and eliminated the ability of shareholders to “pack 
the board.”  In addition, if the board is staggered, the hostile bidder must be 
able to dismantle the staggered board at the annual meeting in one of the 
ways specified above.91 
As with NMT targets, in this scenario the bidder will announce its offer 
and run a proxy contest to replace the board.  If elected, the slate offered by 
the bidder will commit to withdrawing the pill and accepting the bidder’s 
 
88. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228(a) (2000) (permitting shareholder action through 
written consent). 
89. See Steven Lipin & Laurie Hays, IBM Is Seeking to Force Ouster of Lotus Board, 
WALL ST. J., June 7, 1995, at A3. 
90. See Laurie Hays & Steven Lipin, Lotus Gives In and Accepts IBM Offer of $3.52 
Billion, a Sweetened $64 a Share, WALL ST. J., June 12, 1995, at A3. 
91. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.  
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offer.  The only difference between EAT and NMT targets is that here the 
bidder will have to wait until the next annual meeting of shareholders, 
which could be as long as thirteen months away,92 before it can get an up-or-
down verdict from shareholders. 
In many cases, the bidder might be unable to wait—the bidder may need 
to plan, may need to know where it stands, etc.  Furthermore, the benefits 
might dissipate if the bidder has to wait—for example, if the bidder needs 
certain assets now, not a year from now.  Therefore, because a significant 
delay might be required before a proxy contest can be launched, the ballot 
box route may not provide a sufficient safety valve against disloyal 
incumbents of EAT targets in some cases.  Thus, incumbents of EAT targets 
sometimes have significant power to block offers that shareholders would 
support.  
As assessment of the antitakeover consequences of EAT arrangements is 
beyond the scope of our project.  The above discussion, however, indicates 
that EATs do not generally foreclose the ballot box route, for two reasons.  
First, bidders can always win control of the board by winning a one-time 
proxy contest.  Second, although some bidders would have to wait as long as 
thirteen months before being able to run such a contest, bidders that emerge 
not far from the next annual meeting would not have to wait that long.   
However, there is a third class of targets—those with “effective staggered 
boards”—for which the ballot box route is hardly viable.  
 
3.  Effective staggered board. 
 
The third scenario—and the one on which we focus for the remainder of 
this Paper—is the scenario in which the bidder must go through two annual 
meetings in order to gain majority control of the target’s board.  We classify 
these targets as effective staggered board (ESB) targets.  To fit into this 
category, the target must have a staggered board, with at least three classes 
of directors,93 which cannot be dismantled in any of the three ways specified 
above.94 
 
92. See Koppes, Ganske & Haag, supra note 10. 
93. A hostile bidder could gain 50% control of the board in just one proxy contest 
against a target with two classes of directors.  (A particularly lucky hostile bidder might 
even win control of the board in one election if the target had an odd number of 
directors and the proxy contest were brought in the “right” year.)  This qualification is 
technically necessary, though few staggered boards have only two classes of directors.  
For ease of exposition we assume a three-class staggered board throughout the 
remainder of our analysis (which is by far the modal staggered board).  Our arguments 
on the potency of ESBs take on even more force if the staggered board has four classes. 
94. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.  Note that shareholders’ ability to call a  
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In this scenario, the bidder has no choice but to wait through two annual 
meetings in order to gain control of the board.95  As with NMT and EAT 
targets, the bidder will announce its offer and run a first proxy contest to 
gain one-third of the target’s board seats.  Unlike NMT and EAT targets, 
however, the bidder’s candidates will not be able to commit to withdrawing 
the pill if elected, because they will be in the minority.  Instead, they will 
bide their time for a year, until a second annual election of directors will 
(hopefully) give the bidder a majority of board seats.  At that time the board 
will vote to redeem the pill, paving the way for the target to accept the 
bidder’s offer. 
U.S. Surgical’s hostile bid for Circon illustrates the difficulty of this 
route.96  In August 1996, Surgical launched a 100% cash tender offer for 
Circon at $18.00 per share, representing almost a 70% premium over the pre-
announcement share price.  On the advice of Circon’s outside counsel Wilson 
Sonsini, Circon installed a “morning after” poison pill with a 15% trigger 
immediately after the Surgical bid was launched.  Circon’s staggered board 
was provided in the charter, but Circon’s bylaws specified that the number 
of directors would be set by a majority vote of the board.97  While this 
configuration of defenses suggested at least the potential for board packing, 
Circon’s bylaws also specified a two-thirds vote requirement (of outstanding 
shares)98 that effectively eliminated this route.99  Taken together, these 
 
special meeting and shareholder ability to act by written consent are irrelevant in 
determining whether the target has an ESB.  The reason is that even if shareholders can 
act early, if they cannot dismantle the staggered board then there is no action that they 
can take. 
95. If the target has cumulative voting, and if insiders own a sufficiently large stake, 
then it may take three elections for the bidder to gain control of the board because the 
insiders may be able to preserve one seat in each election. For example, if there are three 
classes of three directors each, and insiders own 34% of the shares, insiders can elect one 
director in each election.  See CLARK, supra note 55, at 363 (defining minimum number of 
shares required to elect one director under a cumulative voting system). After two 
elections, the bidder would have won four seats (not six) and still would not control a 
majority of the board.  For our analysis we make the simplifying assumption that the 
target does not have a cumulative voting system.  In fact, cumulative voting is relatively 
uncommon—in our IRRC sample, for example, approximately 10% of firms with 
staggered boards also had cumulative voting, yielding 6% of the total sample that had 
both a staggered board and cumulative voting.  As above, see supra note 93, our 
arguments on the potency of ESBs take on even more force if the target has cumulative 
voting and insiders have a significant stake. 
96. See Hall, Rose & Subramanian, supra note 33. 
97. Circon Bylaws § 3.3. 
98. Circon Bylaws § 9.2. 
99. Circon CEO Richard Auhll owned 12% of the company, and company insiders  
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provisions blocked removal and board packing and gave Circon an ESB.   
Surgical therefore began the prolonged process of going through two annual 
meetings to gain control of Circon. 
In October 1997, more than a year after the bid had been launched, 
Surgical put up a dissident slate of directors and won two seats on Circon’s 
board.  Plans to put up a second slate of directors in October 1998, which 
would have almost certainly led to gaining control of the Circon board, were 
cut short when Surgical sold itself to Tyco in June of that year.  Because Tyco 
had a policy of not making hostile acquisitions, Surgical withdrew its bid for 
Circon.  In September 1998, under pressure from arbitrageurs  (who 
threatened to run their own slate of directors), Circon sold itself in a friendly 
deal to Maxxim Medical Inc. for 17% less than the original Surgical bid, two 
years earlier. 
Surgical’s bid for Circon illustrates the difficulty of the proxy route.  In 
fact, to our knowledge, no bidder has successfully fought through two proxy 
contests to win control of an ESB target.100  This fact suggests that the ballot 
box is not a viable safety valve against an ESB target.  The next Part provides 
a theoretical explanation for why this is true. 
 
D.     The Delay Problem 
 
This Part examines how quickly a hostile bidder can gain control of a 
target through the proxy contest route.  To assess the delay problem, we 
compare the three types of targets that we defined earlier —NMT targets, 
EAT targets, and ESB targets.  In addition, we analyze the delay that would 
be imposed against hostile bidders in two hypothetical regimes—targets 
 
(employees and directors) held another 13%.  See Hall, Rose & Subramanian, supra note 
33, at 4.  Thus Surgical would have had to win 89% of the remaining shares in order to 
successfully amend the bylaws.  While this would have been at least mathematically 
possible, it was made even more difficult by the fact that 10-15% of the shares typically 
do not vote, for miscellaneous reasons, in proxy contests (e.g., they are out of the 
country, or they do not know they own the stock).  Surgical could afford, at most, 8% 
shareholder nonparticipation, and 100% voting in favor among the remaining 
shareholders, in order to successfully pack the board.  That Surgical did not even 
attempt this route—and chose instead the “easier” path of waiting through two annual 
elections—suggests its difficulty. 
100. See infra Part IV.B.2.  When this Article was presented at a “bridge group” of 
academics and practitioners at New York University Law School in April 2001, some 
practitioners claimed to recall situations in which a bidder had in fact won two elections 
against an ESB, but no one could provide a specific example of such an event.  If such 
examples exist, they occurred before 1996—in Part IV we examine all proxy contests 
against ESBs between 1996 and 2000 and find no contests in which a bidder had won 
two elections against an ESB.  
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with effective biennial terms, in which a single class of directors is elected 
every other year (and midterm removal is not possible), and targets with 
effective triennial terms, in which a single class of directors is elected every 
third year.  We first consider the average delay that is imposed against 
hostile bidders, and then we turn to the minimum delay that is imposed. 
 
1.  Average delay. 
 
We make some simplifying assumptions without loss of generality.  First, 
we assume that once a hostile bidder emerges, it has infinite patience and 
determination and will continue to pursue the deal to completion.101  Second, 
we assume that the target’s shareholders are unanimously in favor of the bid 
and will vote for the bidder in any elections that take place.  Third, we 
assume the target’s incumbent board (which by assumption does not own 
any shares) is unanimously against the bid and will take all possible actions 
(to the extent permitted by the law) to prevent the bid from succeeding. 
Comparison of existing regimes.  With these assumptions in place, we now 
calculate how long it will take for the bidder to acquire control after initiating 
a hostile bid that shareholders would like to accept.  The simplest case is 
NMT targets.  Here, the hostile bidder can gain control within a matter of 
months, regardless of when the bid is launched relative to the annual 
shareholders meeting.  IBM’s hostile bid for Lotus, described in Part III.C.1.  
above, provides the clearest example of this case.  For simplicity, we describe 
the delay imposed against NMT targets as zero.102 
Next we consider EAT targets.  Within this category, when the incumbent 
board loses a single proxy contest, it is out of office and the hostile bidder 
wins.  Accordingly, the longest delay that would be imposed against an EAT 
target would be a full year, if the bidder appeared immediately after the 
target’s shareholder meeting.  The shortest delay against an EAT target 
would be zero, if the bidder appeared immediately before the target’s 
shareholder meeting.  If we assume that hostile bids are distributed 
uniformly throughout the year and are uncorrelated with annual meeting 
 
101. Later we explore the implications of relaxing this assumption.  See infra Part 
III.D.2. 
102. For completeness, we note that even bids for NMT targets are subject to some 
legal delay, due to SEC filing requirements and notice requirements under state law and 
target charters and bylaws.  Targets vulnerable to written consent solicitations will be 
more vulnerable than those vulnerable to special meeting calls, because a consent 
solicitation takes effect when filed with a target, whereas a special meeting typically 
requires a solicitation to call the meeting and another solicitation to obtain proxies for 
use at the meeting.  Still, the general point is that NMT targets are vulnerable to much 
more rapid proxy fights (and hence, bids) than EAT and ESB targets.  
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dates,103 then the average delay imposed against EAT targets is six months. 
Now consider the case of ESB targets.  With an ESB, unlike an EAT, 
losing the first battle does not mean losing the war for the target’s board.  
Against an ESB, a hostile bidder will have to win two proxy contests in order 
to gain majority control of the board.  If the hostile bidder appears 
immediately after the target’s annual meeting, it will wait one year, win a 
first election, wait another year, and finally have majority control of the 
board after two years.  If the hostile bidder appears just before the target’s 
annual meeting, it will win one-third immediately, but will have to wait 
another year to gain control, resulting in a total wait of one year.  On 
average, and assuming the same uniform distribution of bids as described 
above, a hostile bidder against an ESB will face a delay of one-and-a-half 
years. 
Recall the argument that Clark, Gilson and others made,104 and with 
which we agreed,105 that, before the pill, directors would not hide behind 
their staggered board but would resign if a bidder bought a majority of the 
shares.  Couldn’t one similarly expect that, even after the pill, if the board 
loses one election, it would in fact resign even though it could stay in power 
for another year?  The answer is no.  The reason is that the incumbents still 
have a reason to fight with an ESB.  Before the pill, when a bidder acquired a 
majority of the shares, further resistance would be futile.  It would simply be 
a matter of time before the target would be required to hold the perfunctory 
annual meeting that would displace an additional one-third of the board, 
thus giving the bidder control.  Furthermore, it would seem illegitimate or at 
least hardly respectful to cling to power for another year when the majority 
shareholder wishes you to leave.  Far better to exit gracefully, in this 
scenario, than be forced out one year later. 
In contrast, with an ESB, when a bidder wins the first election, the fight 
against the bidder is not doomed, because it is far from certain that the 
 
103. This assumption is valid if bidders make bids immediately after identifying 
targets that they would like to purchase and if such findings and the business needs of 
bidders are in no way correlated with the election calendars of targets.  Admittedly, this 
assumption is not completely valid—in a preliminary analysis we find that more than 
half of all annual meetings occur in April and May and that there is a slight increase in 
hostile bid activity in the preceding two to three months.  This sensitivity to annual 
meeting date is slightly greater against targets with ESBs.  These findings suggest that 
the observable delay against the various types of targets, and particularly against ESBs, 
is slightly less than we estimate in our theoretical analysis.  Still, as we show in Part IV, 
the impact of ESBs on bid outcomes is substantial. 
104. See Clark, supra note 55; Gilson, supra note 55. 
105. See supra text accompanying note 56.  
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bidder will win the next election or even stay in the game until then.106  In 
the context of U.S. Surgical’s hostile bid for Circon, for example, Circon 
board member George Cloutier provided this advice to his CEO, friend, and 
Harvard Business School sectionmate Richard Auhll: 
I told Richard “Let’s just wait it out.”  You never know what is going 
to happen.  We’re not going to give up here.  We’re staying until the 
last gun is fired. . . .  That was my position: we fight until the last 
minute, last day, last hour, and something will happen.  And I was 
actually right.107 
Indeed, with an ESB in place, a target board can reasonably attempt to 
wait it out.  The target’s share price may increase through the bid price (as 
was the case with Wallace Computer), a white knight may appear 
(Younkers), the bidder may lose interest or its ability to pursue the bid 
(Circon), or other unforeseeable circumstances may intervene (For example, 
accounting fraud at Cendant forced it to abandon its bid for American 
Bankers.108).  Furthermore, with the shares held by others than the bidder, 
the board would be able to assert that it is serving the legitimate goal of 
protecting its shareholders.  Thus, with the pill, the board will no longer exit 
gracefully after losing the first proxy contest.  Dissident directors may be 
uncomfortable or a nuisance to the incumbent board members, but with an 
ESB dissidents have little to no real power after a single election.109 
Comparison to alternative regimes.  For comparison purposes, we now 
examine the average delay under two hypothetical regimes.  First, consider 
biennial elections of a single class of directors, without any possibility for 
 
106. See John C. Coates IV, An Index of the Contestability of Corporate Control: 
Studying Variation in Legal Takeover Vulnerability (working paper July 17, 1999). 
107. Interview with George Cloutier in Waltham, Mass. (Sept. 8, 2000), transcript at 
15 (on file with the authors). 
108. This example is imperfect because the fraud occurred after Cendant’s bid had 
been accepted.  See Emily Nelson, Leslie Scism & Steven Lipin, Cendant Stock Plummets 
46.5% on News that Accounting Woes Hurt Earnings; Pending Plan to Acquire American 
Bankers Is Put in Doubt by Price Drop, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1998, at A3. 
109. See, e.g., Memorandum from Richard Auhll to Circon employees (Sept. 30, 
1997) (“[K]eep in mind that even if U.S. Surgical wins two seats on our Board, they will 
not have a majority and cannot force a sale of the Company.  So although they may 
make a big deal about the results of the election, the reality is, little actually changes.”), 
quoted in Brian Hall, Christopher J. Rose & Guhan Subramanian, Circon (B) (Harvard 
Business School Case Study N9-801-404) (Mar. 19, 2001).  For a view from the other side, 
consider the comments of Charles Elson, dissident director on the Circon board: “We 
were surrounded.  Brute [Krulak, the other dissident director,] and I were on opposite 
sides of the table, and the rest of them were all around us.”  Hall, Rose & Subramanian, 
supra note 33, at 10.  
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removal in between elections.  As noted earlier, all states, including 
Delaware, are generally thought to require an election each year.110  Under 
this hypothetical regime, if the bidder emerged just before an election, it 
would not have to wait at all, and if it emerged immediately after an election 
(and thus two years away from the next election), it would have to wait two 
years.  Assuming (as above) a uniform distribution of bids uncorrelated with 
annual meeting dates, the average delay under a biennial election 
arrangement would be one year.  Thus a target with biennial elections would 
lead to longer delay, on average, relative to an EAT target (one year versus 
six months), but shorter delay relative to an ESB target (one year versus 
eighteen months). 
As a second alternative regime, consider a triennial election of a single 
class of directors.  If a bidder emerged immediately before an election, it 
would not wait at all; if it emerged immediately after an election it would 
have to wait three years.  The average wait would be one-and-a-half years, 
which is the same delay as against an ESB target.  This fact suggests that 
ESBs provide the same average delay against a hostile bidder as a triennial 
election of a single class of directors.  We now show, however, that other 
considerations might make ESBs even more powerful against hostile bids 
than a three-year single-class arrangement. 
 
2.  Minimum delay. 
 
So far we have limited our comparison to the average delay.  Of course, 
any given bidder is influenced not by the average delay but by the delay in 
its particular case.  We therefore now consider the distribution of potential 
lengths of delay.  Table 1 summarizes the analysis from the previous section: 
 
 
110. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.  See also Robert Frank, Comcast, 
AT&T BroadBand Protect Board, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2002) at C16 (noting that Comcast-
AT&T Broadband charter does not allow an election of directors until 2005, and stating 
that “merger attorneys say they know of no other cases where an entire board was 
locked up for two years or more”).  This provision of the Comcast charter is currently 
being challenged under Pennsylvania corporate law.  See Jaret Seiberg, Investors Sue in 
$42B Comcast Deal, THE DAILY DEAL (Feb. 20, 2002).  
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No Minimum Term 
(NMT) 
0 0 0 
Effective Annual Term 
(EAT) 
0 1 ½ 
Effective Staggered Board 
(ESB) 
1 2  1  ½ 
Biennial Election of a 
Single Class 
0 2 1 
Triennial Election of a 
Single Class 
0 3  1  ½ 
 
Table 1 shows that, under a three-year arrangement, delay ranges from 
zero years to three years.  Thus the possibility remains open that a bidder 
lucky enough (or astute enough112) to emerge close to the next election 
would have to bear only a small delay in the event that the incumbent board 
rejects its offer.  In contrast, with an ESB, delay ranges from one year to two 
years—under no circumstances can a bidder get a referendum on its offer 
without a delay of at least a year. 
This difference is critical.  At the outset of this Part we assumed that 
bidders have infinite patience and determination.  However, there are many 
potential bidders whose patience is more limited.  Buyers often need to have 
resolution, and cannot allow the question to remain unresolved for more 
than a year.  Consider a buyer that needs a certain type of asset.  If it does not 
ultimately buy target T, then the buyer should acquire another company 
instead (or build the asset in-house).  If T has an ESB and T’s board is 
unwilling to sell, the buyer would be foolhardy to wait for a year (or longer) 
to determine whether its hostile bid against T will succeed.  Instead the 
buyer should look elsewhere.  Therefore an ESB should provide incumbents 
virtually complete protection from hostile bids, with all of the potential 
drawbacks in terms of managerial agency costs that are associated with such 
insulation.  In contrast, a three-year arrangement may or may not provide 
such protection, depending on when the bidder happens to emerge in 
relation to the time of the scheduled election. 
Putting the same point slightly differently, an ESB condenses the 
distribution of delays toward the middle when compared to a triennial 
 
111. This calculation assumes that bids are distributed uniformly throughout the 
year and are uncorrelated with shareholder meeting dates. 
112. See supra note 103.  
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election of directors.  It eliminates those cases in which the delay will be less 
than a year, but also eliminates those cases in which the delay will be more 
than two years.  The first effect buys incumbents more protection than the 
possible reduction in protection caused by the latter effect.  Having a 
significant possibility that a hostile bidder will face only a short delay will 
make the incumbent vulnerable.  In contrast, shortening delay from two-and-
a-half years to one-and-a-half years does not create large incremental 
exposure for the target board, because one-and-a-half years is still a long 
time in a dynamic business environment.  In short, the elimination of any 
possibility of delay below one year closes an important window of 
vulnerability, whereas the reduction of delay to the still long delay of one or 
two years is unlikely to have a significant impact. 
 
E.     The Two-Election Problem 
 
So far we have seen why an ESB would impose a heavier burden on a 
hostile bidder than even a triennial election of directors, in terms of the delay 
in taking over the board.  But there is another dimension, beyond mere 
delay.  When all directors can be removed together, a bidder would have to 
win only one election.  In contrast, an ESB requires such a bidder to win two 
elections, one year apart.  This two-election requirement imposes an 
additional significant hurdle. 
To see why, consider two situations, both with the same delay.  In one 
scenario the bidder needs to win only one election, and in the other scenario 
the bidder needs to win two elections.  To be concrete, compare (i) a situation 
in which all directors are elected to two-year terms, and in which a bidder 
emerges fifteen months before the next election; with (ii) a situation in which 
there is an ESB and a bidder emerges three months before an election.  In 
both situations, delay would be fifteen months before the bidder could gain 
control of the board.  But, as explained below, situation (ii) is more difficult 
for the bidder to gain control because, even though the total wait would be 
the same, the bidder would have to win two elections one year apart. 
The problem is this:  In the case of one election, once it comes, however 
distant in the future, the buyer will know how much it is willing to pay for 
the company, and will put an offer on the table.  In example (i) above, the 
hostile bidder will wait until the election and then run a proxy contest.  The 
bidder will announce its acquisition price concurrently with the proxy fight, 
which it will set on the basis of its own and general market conditions. 
In situation (ii), with two votes a year apart, the bidder faces a problem.  
In the first election, if the bidder does not make a firm offer for the target, 
target shareholders will be reluctant to vote for the bidder’s slate, and the 
bidder’s chances of success will be diminished.  If the bidder makes a firm  
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offer, however, the bidder will expose itself to risk—essentially the bidder 
will be providing the target shareholders with a year-long put option for 
their shares.  For this reason two elections are far more difficult than one.  In 
the discussion below we start with the general problem of winning the proxy 
contest without a firm offer on the table, and then turn to additional 
difficulties presented by an ESB. 
 
1.  The importance of a firm offer for winning a proxy contest. 
 
There are strong reasons to believe that when a bidder in a proxy contest 
for control does not make an acquisition offer, it will be difficult for the 
bidder to win.113  Shareholders will be reluctant to vote for a bidder that does 
not put an acquisition offer on the table.  The bidder might be interested in 
pursuing its own interests rather than increasing shareholder value.  Because 
winning would provide the bidder with private benefits of control, 
shareholders cannot infer from the mere mounting of a fight that they will be 
better off if the bidder wins.  Their welfare will depend on how the bidder 
and the incumbents compare, an assessment that shareholders may not be 
well-positioned to make.  Being imperfectly informed about the quality of 
the bidders, the shareholders might vote on the basis of the average quality 
of bidders, which might lead them to vote generally against bidders in proxy 
contests not backed by a firm acquisition offer.  This argument is consistent 
with empirical evidence suggesting that proxy contests for control, without 
an accompanying tender offer, are seldom successful.114 
By making a firm offer for the target’s shares in conjunction with its 
proxy fight, a bidder eliminates the need for shareholders to make an 
assessment of how well the bidder would run the firm.  Instead, to determine 
 
113. For a fuller analysis of this point, using a formal model of voting with and 
without an acquisition offer on the table, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, 
Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control, (Working Paper No. 336, 
John M. Olin Center, Harvard Law School, October 2001). 
114. While we argue that it is difficult to win a first election without having a firm 
offer on the table, we do not claim that it is impossible. There have been situations in 
which shareholders are so dissatisfied with existing managers that, notwithstanding the 
considerations discussed here, they have voted for a challenger.  In our hostile bid 
sample, described in more detail in Part IV below, only one bidder was successful in 
winning the target by bringing a proxy contest without an accompanying tender offer—
this was Huntsman’s July 1996 offer to acquire Rexene Corp.  Note that even in this bid 
there was a specific offer on the table ($15 cash per share, eventually increased to $16 
cash), though the bidder did not make a formal tender offer.  The proxy route on its 
own may have been more effective than usual in this case because it was initiated by 
Guy Wyser-Pratte, a 10% holder of Rexene and a noted shareholder activist.  
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whether they would be better off, shareholders simply need to compare the 
offer price (which is much less speculative than the expected monetary value 
of the company under the bidder’s management) with their assessment of 
the target’s value. 
 
2.  The importance of a firm offer against an ESB. 
 
We now turn to the specific case of a first proxy contest against an ESB to 
elect one-third of the board.  Here, the contest is not over full board control 
but rather over a rival team putting its foot in the door.  For the reasons 
described above, the bidder would find it difficult to win the proxy contest 
unless it put a firm offer on the table.  In the specific context of an ESB, there 
are two additional reasons that a firm offer is necessary.  First, shareholders 
may not want to let the bidder infiltrate their board with a minority of 
directors, who could then conduct due diligence from the inside and report 
back to the bidder, unless there was a firm commitment on the offer.  Second, 
it may be costly to have a hostile, dissenting group on the board.115  Thus, if 
the bidder is not going to make an offer in a year (as happened in the end in 
Circon), putting the bidder’s team on the board for now is costly.  Circon 
Chairman and CEO Richard Auhll described the enormous difficulty in 
running his company with a hostile takeover bid pending and two dissident 
directors on his board: 
We were terrified that we would lose our employees and that would 
destroy our ability to operate the company.  That was a major, major 
issue, trying to hold our team together. .  .  .  So I was a major 
cheerleader out there for the employees, trying to keep up morale and 
keep the esprit de corps up. . . .  We spent a lot of money on incentives 
for the sales force to stay in place, because the sales force was vital to 
the whole issue.  And it turns out, those efforts were not successful.  
No matter how much money we threw at it, it was not enough to keep 
the sales force in place.  .  .  .  Over the full 26 month period [of the 
hostile bid], our sales remained basically level.116 
Electing a minority dissident slate can be thought of as an investment by 
shareholders in the bidder’s program.  If the bidder does not complete its 
takeover a year later, then shareholders do not get their “payoff” from this 
investment, and would have been better off not putting a disruptive group 
on the board in the first place. 
 
115. See, e.g., Topps Co. Proxy Statement, Proposal No. 4 (May 28, 1998) (“A proxy 
fight, regardless of whether successful, can seriously distract a company’s management 
and board of directors and impose substantial costs on the company.”). 
116. See Hall, Rose & Subramanian, supra note 33.  
  37
3.  The cost of committing to a price. 
 
What is so difficult in having to make a bid (or some strong commitment 
to a price) in the first election?  Why would this deter or make difficult some 
potential acquisitions?   The problem is that in a dynamic world the value of 
the target can change over time; thus making an irreversible or even strong 
commitment to a price for a considerable period exposes a bidder to 
substantial risk. 
To illustrate, consider a bidder that emerges when the independent value 
of the ESB target is $100.  Assume the best case—the next annual meeting is 
imminent, and the following annual election is a year after that.  Assume 
further that the target will have either positive developments or negative 
developments over the next year, and as a result the value of the target as an 
independent entity will be either $130 or $70, each with a 50% probability.  
Finally, assume that the bidder can manage the assets more efficiently, or can 
produce gains from synergy, which makes the value of the assets to the 
bidder 120% of the independent value of the target.  This final assumption 
means that if the bidder were able to wait until a year from now and then 
make an offer, the bidder would always be able to make an offer that 
shareholders would find attractive.117 
Now let us turn to the bidder’s predicament if the bidder needs to win 
two elections, one now and one in one year.  We have argued in the previous 
section that the bidder needs to commit to a price now that it will keep open 
until the next election.  What price (P) should the bidder offer now, just 
before the first election?  If the bidder makes a firm offer of P and binds itself 
to it for a year, shareholders will be free to accept or reject it later on, and the 
target board will be free to bring in rivals with competing offers. 
For example, consider what would happen if the bidder were to offer a 
price of $110, open for one year.  This offer would be enough to win now, if 
there could be a decisive referendum now.  In a year, if the target has 
positive developments, the independent value of the target would go up to 
$130, and shareholders would reject the offer.  If the target has negative 
developments, the independent value of the target would decline to $70, and 
shareholders would accept the offer.  Of course, in the event of negative 
developments getting the target for $110 will be a losing proposition for the 
bidder, who would value it only at $84 ($70 x 120%). 
The problem is that making a firm offer at $110—or at any other price—
effectively gives target shareholders a put option for their shares.  In a single-
 
117. Note that the bidder cannot commit now to bid 120% (or something between 
100% and 120%) of the market price one year later because as the commitment date 
approached the target’s share price would be bid up without any clear limit, stopping 
only at the point at which the bidder’s commitment to the offer were no longer credible.  
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election regime, the option is not worth a great deal because it expires 
relatively quickly.  In a two-election regime, giving the option is costly 
because it will extend for one year or longer.118 In the simple numerical 
example provided above, the bidder will win only when the target 
experiences negative developments, but of course in this scenario the bidder 
does not want to win.  The only solution to this manifestation of the classic 
“lemons problem” is for the bidder not to bid.  Thus, in this example, even 
though the value of the target’s assets would be higher in the hands of the 
bidder, there is no firm offer that would enable the bidder to win the first 
round yet would be profitable for the bidder to make.119  The bidder will be 
unwilling to make a firm offer or will reduce the amount that it would be 
willing to offer, either of which would make it more difficult to win the 
requisite two elections. 
We do not claim that it is impossible for a bidder to win two elections.  If 
the shareholders are sufficiently desperate about their existing situation they 
might be willing to vote for the bidder even without a firm offer.  And if the 
bidder values the target sufficiently highly, it might be worthwhile to bear 
the cost of making a firm offer.  Our point is only that the two-election 
problem imposes an additional and substantial cost that makes the ballot box 
route extremely difficult. 
 
4.  Comparison to the one-election case. 
 
To close this Part, it is worth highlighting the difficulty of having to win 
twice by noting how the volatility of the assets of the target over time would 
not be an impediment in a case in which the bidder faced delay but did not 
need to win two separate elections.  Using the bidder in the above numerical 
example, assume an election arrangement in which the bidder would have to 
wait a year and then could run one proxy contest for the board as a whole. 
In this case, assuming that the bidder is willing to bear the cost of delay, 
the volatility of the assets over the interim year would not be a problem, 
because the bidder could simply observe the target’s asset value just before 
 
118. In theory the bidder could adopt a hedging strategy that would provide 
insurance against the value of the target going down, but this strategy would simply 
replace the implicit cost of the free put with an explicit cost of the premium needed to 
purchase such insurance.  Basic option theory predicts that these two costs should be 
equal. 
119. For simplicity we have presented an example with two discrete outcomes ($70 
or $130), but the argument continues to hold if we allow a continuous distribution of 
outcomes.  As long as the value of the target could fall below $92 as a stand-alone entity 
(which means that the value to the bidder would fall below $110), the put option at $110 
is costly for the bidder to give.    
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making its bid.  If the target had positive developments and its value 
increased to $130, the bidder would bid somewhere between $130 and $156 
(120% of $130).  If the target had negative developments and its independent 
value went down to $70, the bidder would bid somewhere between $70 and 
$84 (120% of $70).  This example illustrates the point that the existence of one 
definitive election enables the bidder to makes its final commitment to price 
just before the outcome is resolved through the proxy contest.  Unlike the 
ESB scenario, in this scenario bids are not deterred. 
The analysis in this Part demonstrates that even in those cases in which 
an ESB and a two-year (or three-year) arrangement would present the bidder 
with the same delay, the former would constitute a much more formidable 
takeover defense.  Under the latter, if the bidder is sufficiently patient (a big 
“if” to be sure), the bidder will be able to eventually reach an up-or-down 
referendum on an offer it will be able to determine at the time of the 
referendum.  With an ESB, however, this possibility does not exist. 
 
F.     Conclusion 
 
In closing this Part, we return to our initial objective, which is to assess 
the viability of the ballot box safety valve against disloyal target boards.  In 
Part III.C we argued that it is necessary to distinguish among three types of 
targets in order to answer this question:  (1) targets with no minimum term 
for board members (“NMT targets”); (2) targets which have an effective 
annual term (“EAT targets”); and (3) targets with effective staggered boards 
(“ESB targets”).  The ballot box is a meaningful safety valve against NMT 
targets, because a bidder can relatively quickly take its case directly to the 
shareholders of a disloyal target board.  The ballot box is less effective 
against EAT targets, but still there is a meaningful path to success, 
particularly in the (approximately) three months before the target’s annual 
meeting.  The ballot box, however, does not seem to be an effective safety 
valve against ESB targets.   
We have presented theoretical reasons for predicting ESBs to have a 
strong antitakeover effect.  This effect is likely to be of a different order of 
magnitude than other types of antitakeover charter and bylaw provisions.  
Not only does an ESB provide more delay and longer guaranteed tenure for 
an incumbent board, but, more importantly, it creates additional 
impediments by (i) eliminating any possibility that a buyer might emerge at 
a point in time that would not require delay, and (ii) requiring victories in 
two elections rather than one.  Indeed, our analysis has shown that the 
antitakeover effects of an ESB are stronger not only than other existing 
antitakeover arrangements, but of hypothetical arrangements (currently not 
permissible) under which elections would be held only every two or three  
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years.  We now turn to test these theoretical arguments against the available 
empirical evidence. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
The analysis of the preceding Part predicts that (1) ESBs make it more 
difficult for a hostile bidder to win control of the target’s board through the 
ballot box mechanism; and (2) because the ballot box safety valve is rendered 
less effective when the target has an ESB, an ESB increases the likelihood that 
a target can remain independent when faced with a hostile takeover bid.  We 
test these two hypotheses against the empirical evidence in Parts B, C, and D 
below and find strong support for both.  In Parts E and F we examine 
whether ESBs provide countervailing benefits to takeover targets and find no 
evidence that they do.  Part G concludes by estimating the aggregate losses 
caused to target shareholders by ESBs.   
 
A.     Data Description 
 
Prior empirical studies of takeover defenses have found that these 
defenses  have little or no effect on bid outcomes.120  These results are 
consistent with practitioner wisdom that takeover defenses matter only at 
the margin.121  However, these studies are problematic because they focus 
exclusively on the pill and fail to consider staggered boards and how they 
interact with the pill.122  As described in Part III.B, the pill by itself is not a 
potent defense, but the pill/staggered board combination has a substantial 
effect on bids.  Furthermore, whether a target has a pill in place prior to a bid 
is also unimportant, given the ability of targets to adopt pills rapidly in 
 
120. See, e.g.,  JAMIL  ABOUMERI, POISON  PILLS AND SHAREHOLDER  VALUE, 1992-96 
(1997) (finding that firms with pills are less likely to defeat hostile takeover bids than 
firms without pills); James A. Brickley, Jeffrey L. Coles & Rory L. Terry, Outside Directors 
and the Adoption of Poison Pills, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 371 (1994) (finding that the proportion of 
outside directors does not influence the success rate of bids against firms with pills, but 
it does increase the likelihood that the target will be auctioned once a bid has been 
brought); Coates, supra note 58 (finding that pre-bid poison pills have no impact on bid 
outcomes); Michael Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J. 
FIN. ECON. 377, 407-08 (1988) (finding that 31% of firms with pills remained 
independent, compared to 16% of firms without pills).  
121. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. 
122. See, e.g., ABOUMERI, supra note 120, Brickley, Coles & Terry, supra note 120; 
Ryngaert,  supra note 120.  For a more detailed assessment of the existing empirical 
literature, see Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 3.  
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response to a bid.123 
To correct these deficiencies, we constructed a new data set of hostile bids 
made against U.S. targets that were initiated and resolved between January 
1996 and December 2000.  The data set includes all the bids, 92 in number, 
for which there was data in the Thompson Financial Securities Data 
(formerly Securities Data Corporation) (SDC) database in November 1999 for 
the 1996-98 bids and in March 2001 for the 1999-2000 bids.  Altogether our 
data set includes 92 bids.  Specific charter and bylaw terms of each target 
were taken from the targets’ filings with the SEC,124 to determine whether 
staggered boards are effective or can be evaded as described in Part III.C.  
Bidder and target SEC filings, as well as newspaper accounts, were used to 
verify bid outcomes and to classify bids as bust-up or stand-alone.125  Stock 
prices were obtained from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) 
database.  Summary data on target and bid characteristics and overall 
outcomes for this data set are presented in Table 2. 
 
 
123. See Coates, supra note 58. 
124. Specifically, each target’s filings were found by searching for the target in the 
SEC’s online EDGAR database, available at http://www.sec.gov/edaux/formlynx.htm.  
An exhibit list to the latest Form 10-K was reviewed to determine where to find the 
target’s charter and bylaws, and relevant filings were obtained either from the target’s 
online filings or, where they were unavailable, from Compact Disclosure (a private SEC 
filing service in CD-ROM and paper formats).  Once obtained, charters and bylaws were 
analyzed as described in Coates, supra note 106. 
125. Specifically, the target’s filings were found, as described in the preceding note, 
and Schedules 14D-1 (or Schedules TO) were searched to see if the bidder made a tender 
offer as part of the hostile bid.  If so, the “Background” section of the related offer to 
purchase (filed as an exhibit to the Schedule 14D-1) was read to determine if the bid was 
a bust-up bid and to confirm bidder identity, premium, deal size, and other data, and 
outcomes were determined by reviewing subsequent amendments to the Schedule 14D-
1.  If no Schedule 14D-1 was filed, Schedules 14A were reviewed to see if the bidder 
conducted a proxy fight or consent solicitation as part of the bid; if so, similar 
procedures were followed.  If not, Forms 8-K and 10-Q, as well as news stories in 
Lexis/News, available at http://www.lexis.com, were reviewed to confirm SDC data on 
the bid, its characteristic, and outcomes.  
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Table 2: Summary Data on Hostile Bid & Target Characteristics 
% of sample or 
median (mean) 




   
Size ($ million)  $481 ($2,967)  $704 ($2,610)  $280 ($3,309) 
Delaware 
corporation 
51.1% 57.8% 44.7% 
      
Defenses     
Staggered  board  60.9% 100% 23.4% 
Effective 
staggered board 
48.9% —  — 
Fair price 
provision 
25.0% 35.6% 14.9% 
Pre-bid poison 
pill 
68.5% 73.3% 63.8% 
Supermajority 
vote provision 
30.4% 37.8% 23.4% 
      
Bid 
Characteristics 
   
Tender offer  54.3%  51.1%  57.4% 
Proxy fight  43.5%  35.6%  51.1% 
Tender offer & 
proxy fight 
33.7% 33.3% 34.0% 
Bust-up bid  19.6%  24.4%  14.9% 
Bear hug bid  35.9%  46.7%  25.5% 
Final bid 
premium  
37.2% (43.2%) 38.5% (44.1%)  35.0% (42.4%)
 
Table 2 shows that 61% of bids (56 bids) were brought against targets 
with staggered boards.  Of those, eleven SBs were not “effective” as takeover 
defenses in the sense discussed above.  Thus, of the ninety-two bids, 49% 
were brought against targets with ESBs.  Pre-bid poison pills are present at 
nearly 70% of targets; moreover, all targets in our sample that did not have 
pills at the time of the bid announcement put in “morning after” pills as the 
first step toward resistance or at least to gain time and bargaining power 
against the bidder.126 
 
126.E . g ., Bill Atkinson, Glen Burnie Bancorp Tries to Resist Hostile Takeover, BALT. 
SUN (Feb. 18, 1998), at 3C (Glen Burnie adopts pill in response to hostile bid); Urocor  
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B.  Viability of the Ballot Box Mechanism 
 
In Part III we argued that the ballot box mechanism is not an effective 
route against ESB targets.  In this Part we test this prediction empirically by 
examining the outcomes of the proxy contests in our data set.  Note that the 
mere existence of proxy solicitations against ESB targets does not necessarily 
mean that proxy contests are a viable route against such targets.  Proxy 
contests could be launched for several reasons independent of their 
effectiveness as a way of taking over the target–for example, to complement 
a concurrent public relations campaign intended to put market pressure on 
the board or to show the bidder’s seriousness.  The best test to assess the 
effectiveness of the proxy contest route is to examine whether there are cases 
in which a target is taken over against the wishes of the incumbent board 
due to the presence of this route.   
Note that we define these “ballot box victories” broadly, to include not 
only situations in which the bidder actually wins control over the board but 
also situations in which target management capitulates and agree to an 
acquisition a short time before the shareholder vote.  The reason is that once 
a bidder is fairly certain to gain control of the board in an imminent vote, 
managers might well choose to make a graceful exit, possibly extracting 
some benefit for themselves, which would not be possible after the vote has 
occurred.  A bidder’s gaining control over the board can become fairly 
certain only close in time to the relevant vote, because until then there is still 
some chance that a change in circumstances will make the bidder’s offer less 
attractive or that the bidder will withdraw its bid (as happened in Circon). 
 
1.  Against ESB targets. 
 
Applying our test, we find not a single ballot box victory against the ESB 
targets in our sample.  In fact, only one proxy fight against an ESB (Circon) 
went to a shareholder vote for the first time.  In the Circon situation, the 
hostile bidder (U.S. Surgical) was itself taken over and withdrew five months 
before the second shareholder vote.  Thus, Circon illustrates why target 
managers faced with an attractive acquisition proposal do not have to 
assume that the bidder will gain control ultimately—the ESB gives the target 
 
Rejects Dianon’s Acquisition Advances, MEDICAL INDUSTRY TODAY, Aug. 21, 1998, available 
at http://www.lexis.com (Urocor adopted pill after it received hostile bid); Acme-
Cleveland Corp. Form 8-A/A (filed June 3, 1996), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/2066/0000950152-96-002745.txt (referring to a 
rights plan adoption on March 11, 1996, four days after Danaher Corp. launched its bid 
for Acme-Cleveland); Hall, Rose & Subramanian, supra note 33, at 5 (reporting that 
Circon installed a poison pill just days after U.S. Surgical launched its hostile bid).  
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substantial time, and during that time unforeseen events may intervene to 
allow the target to remain independent.  Thus, in our sample period, no 
bidder has come closer than five months to running the second proxy contest 
necessary for a ballot box victory. 
It might be argued that we should include instances where a bidder wins 
a single proxy contest—such as the Circon situation—as “ballot box 
victories,” because the election of a single slate of insurgent directors may 
put sufficient pressure on the target’s incumbent board members so that they 
concede.  Looking outside of our sample period, Weyerhaeuser’s recent and 
well-publicized hostile bid for Willamette provides a good illustration of this 
point:  After Weyerhaeuser won one-third of the seats on Willamette’s board 
in July 2001, the two companies negotiated a friendly sale in January 2002.127  
However, in three other instances in which a hostile bidder won a first proxy 
contest against an ESB—Moore’s hostile bid for Wallace Computer, Carson 
Pirie Scott’s bid for Younkers, and Boston Bank of Commerce’s bid for 
Carver Bancorp—the initial bidder did not eventually win control of the 
target.  Thus out of the five instances in recent memory in which the bidder 
won a first proxy contest against an ESB, only in one case (Weyerhaeuser) 
was the initial bidder eventually successful. 
In any particular contest, various factors will determine how much 
“market” pressure is brought to bear on incumbents, for example: the 
presence of precatory shareholder resolutions opposing defenses or 
proposing sale; the number and fraction of independent directors on the 
target’s board; the percentage of shareholders who have tendered into the 
bidder’s offer; the effectiveness of the bidder’s public relation campaign; the 
presence of activist institutional investors.  A bidder’s winning one proxy 
contest against an ESB—which would be a clear indication of shareholders’ 
support for the offer—is certainly a factor that would add to the pressure on 
incumbents.  However, the critical point is that, as a legal matter, a victory in 
one election, or the manifestation of shareholder support for the offer in 
other ways, does not preclude the target’s board from holding firm until the 
second election if it chooses to—and thus does not in any way guarantee 
success for the bidder.  The examples noted above of bidders winning one 
election but not ultimately gaining control provide a vivid illustration of this 
point.  
In sum, we are unaware of any instance, either during the sample period 
or outside it, in which a bidder successfully gained control of the target using 
the ballot box.  This has not been the case, however, with respect to non-ESB 
targets.  
 
127 See Willamette Industries Inc.: Weyerhaeuser Slate Gains Seats on Company’s Board, WALL 
ST. J. (July 17, 2001) at C13; Jim Carlton & Robin Sidel, Willamette Agrees to be Bought by 
Weyerhaeuser, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2002) at A3.  
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2.  Against non-ESB targets. 
 
In contrast, the ballot box mechanism seems to be a viable mechanism 
against non-ESB targets.  In March 1999, for example, Philips launched a 
proxy contest against VLSI after VLSI rejected its unsolicited $17-per-share 
tender offer.  VLSI was an NMT target, so Philips immediately began 
soliciting proxies to act by written consent.128  In May 1999, Philips withdrew 
its proxy solicitation when VLSI agreed to a negotiated sale for $21 per share. 
Similarly, noted shareholder activist Guy Wyser-Pratte launched a proxy 
contest against Rexene in April 1997, in order to replace the incumbent board 
with directors who would accept Huntsman’s hostile bid.  The special 
shareholders’ meeting was scheduled for May twenty-second; on May 
twentieth, Rexene entered into talks with Huntsman and negotiated the sale.   
A third example of a ballot box victory against a target without an ESB is 
the Fant Industries bid for HEI.  In this case, Fant actually went through with 
its proxy contest and won four seats on the target’s board in August 1998.  
Fant then replaced the CEO and consummated its hostile bid. 
Taken together, these findings support the theoretical arguments put 
forward in Part III, that the ballot box route is an ineffective route against an 
ESB but an effective route against a non-ESB.  In fact, winning through the 
ballot box mechanism against an ESB seems very difficult indeed.  As 
emphasized earlier, the argument does not imply that hostile bidders will 
never be successful against ESBs.  But the important point is that, if the 
incumbents decide to resist, the ability of the bidder to oust them remains 
extremely limited. 
 
C.     Remaining Independent in the Short-run 
 
If the ballot box route is not an effective safety valve against an ESB, we 
would expect that targets will have greater ability to remain independent 
with an ESB.129  This Part examines bid outcomes in the short-run, defined as 
the first nine months after the hostile bid announcement.  In the next Part, we 
examine target independence in the longer run, defined as the thirty-month 
period after bid announcement. 
 
128. See Steven Lipin, Philips Electronics Readies Proxy Fight if VLSI Refuses to 
Negotiate on Offer, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1999, at B6 (“The biggest chink [in VLSI’s takeover 
defenses] is that any entity that owns VLSI shares can effectively remove the board by 
canvassing shareholders via a so-called consent solicitation at any time.”). 
129.C f .   Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950, 951 (1979) (demonstrating how the “shadow 
of the law” provides endowments that influence outcomes).  
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1.  General findings. 
 
Figure 3 shows the short-run outcomes of all bids against ESBs (n=45) 
and non-ESBs (n=47) between 1996 and 2000.  For purposes of the analysis 
the short-run is defined as nine months after the hostile bid is brought, 
though in Part IV.C.4 we show that the results do not change in any 
significant way if we use six months or twelve months after bid 
announcement as the timeframe for analysis. 
 








































Figure 3 reveals a striking difference in success rates depending on the 
target’s defenses:  60% of ESB targets remained independent against a hostile 
bid, compared to 34% of non-ESB targets.  The difference is made up of fewer 
sales to initial bidders (16% of ESB targets versus 32% of non-ESB targets) 
and fewer sales to white knights (24% of ESB targets versus 34% of non-ESB 
targets).  These results are consistent with our findings from Part IV.B, which 
show that proxy contests are an ineffective route against ESBs.  These results 
also call into question the findings from prior studies that purport to show 
that takeover defenses generally have no impact on bid outcomes. 
 
2.  Controlling for other parameters. 
 
To control for factors other than ESBs that could plausibly influence the 
outcome of takeover contests, we have used multivariate regression analysis.  
The control factors used in this analysis include the target’s other takeover 
defenses (dual class stock, fair price provision, pre-bid poison pill, 
supermajority voting provision), bid features (proxy fight, bear hug bid, 
tender offer, bust-up bid), and control variables (natural log of deal size, bid 
premium, and whether target is a Delaware firm).    
This analysis shows that ESBs continue to have the predicted impact on 
outcomes and target independence rates when we control for these other  
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factors.130  Using the method of recycled predictions, the results indicate that 
ESBs nearly double the average target’s odds of remaining independent, from 
34% to 61%, cut the odds of a bidder completing its bid from 34% to 14%, 
and cut the odds that the average target in our sample will be forced into 
selling to a white knight, from 32% to 25%.131  These results are consistent 
with the basic findings presented in Figure 3. 
 
3.  Selection problems. 
 
It might be suggested that ESBs have another effect on remaining 
independent that is not captured by the analysis thus far.  So far we have 
taken as given that a bid has been made.  But whether a bid is made might 
depend on defenses—specifically, the presence of an ESB might discourage 
some bids.  Thus, the bids that are made for ESBs might be a subset of bids 
that would have been made otherwise; indeed, this subset might be skewed 
toward buyers that are relatively more determined and motivated. 
We agree that such a selection might be taking place.132  However, its 
presence would imply that the effect of an ESB on the likelihood of 
remaining independent is even larger than suggested by our already strong 
results.  Here we show that an ESB increases the odds of independence by 
defeating bids that occur; a selection effect would imply that ESBs also 
increase the odds of independence by discouraging offers from being made 
in the first place. 
In addition to this bidder-side selection effect, there is a potential target-
side selection effect:  It might be the case that targets with ESBs are different 
in some underlying features that lead to the adoption of the ESB in the first 
place.  According to this view, it would be these underlying features, and not 
the presence of the ESB, that are responsible for the increased likelihood of 
independence.  However, this potential target-side endogeneity problem is 
mitigated considerably by the fact that that most of the targets in our data set 
existed prior to 1990.  For such mature companies, ESB installation could 
have occurred only before 1990, because (for reasons discussed in Part II.D) a 
charter amendment to install a staggered board became extremely difficult 
after 1990.  So whether these targets had ESBs in the mid to late 1990s 
 
130. A detailed presentation of the model specification and results is provided in 
our working paper, Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 3. 
131. The method of recycled predictions compares the likelihood of each outcome 
in two hypothetical scenarios:  one in which all targets have ESBs and one in which all 
targets do not have ESBs. 
132. But cf. supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (finding that practitioners 
seem to underestimate the antitakeover power of staggered boards, which in turn 
suggests that bid deterrence might be minimal).   
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depended on actions taken in the 1980s or even earlier.  Different decisions in 
this earlier era are unlikely to translate into large enough differences between 
the ESB and non-ESB targets in the 1990s to account for the results we get.133 
 
4.  Defining the short-run. 
 
While the difference in target independence rates documented in Figure 3 
also appears when we examine a six-month window after bid announcement 
(73% independence rate among ESB targets compared to a 47% 
independence rate among non-ESB targets), we find that many bid outcomes 
in our sample are still uncertain after six months.  By nine months, however, 
we find that virtually all of the dust has settled on the initial hostile bids.  In 
fact we find that only two bid outcomes in our data set changed in the nine 
to twelve month window:  ITT fended off Hilton and sold itself to Starwood 
in November 1997 (bid was announced in January 1997), and Healthdyne 
fended off Invacare and sold it sold itself to Respironics, also in November 
1997 (original bid also announced in January 1997).  Both of these targets did 
not have staggered boards, so the results are more pronounced in favor of 
ESB target independence when we use twelve months for our short-run 
window: 30% independence rate for non-ESB targets (14 out of 47), 
compared to the same 60% independence rate for ESB targets (27 out of 45).  
Nevertheless, we use a nine-month window instead of a twelve-month 
window for our short-run analysis because wealth effects, which we examine 
in Parts IV.E through IV.G, become increasingly problematic to calculate as 
the time frame for analysis gets longer.134  Still, to alleviate concerns that we 
are missing part of the story by looking only at short-run outcomes, we 
examine long-run bid outcomes in the next Part. 
 
 
133. In prior work one of us has argued that selection effects may be the cause for 
Robert Daines’ finding that Delaware firms have higher Tobin’s Q than non-Delaware 
firms.  See Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 46; Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve 
Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001). The critical difference between the 
reincorporation decision and the staggered board decision is that reincorporations 
continued to be a viable option for managers throughout the 1990s, see Subramanian, 
supra note 30 (manuscript at 23 tbl. 1) (reporting 373 midstream reincorporations among 
U.S. public companies in the 1990s), while the ability to adopt a staggered board was 
effectively unavailable to managers after 1990.  See Klausner, supra note 42, at 3-4 (“This 
decline [in staggered board proposals] reflects management realization that there is no 
point in even asking shareholders to support a classified board.”).  In short, the 
staggered board decision, unlike the reincorporation decision, was effectively frozen as 
of 1990; therefore it seems reasonable to take ESB incidence as exogenous to events that 
occurred in our 1996-2000 sample period. 
134.  See sources cites infra note 142.  
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D.     Remaining Independent in the Longer-run 
 
In Part II.E we described the conventional wisdom among M&A 
practitioners that a target, once put into play by a hostile bidder, will be sold 
either to the hostile bidder or to a white knight.  The empirical evidence 
presented in Part IV.C suggests that this conventional wisdom is incorrect, at 
least in the short run, if the target has an ESB.  Nevertheless, it might still be 
argued that ESB targets are eventually sold once a bid is made, but the 
outcome takes longer to play out because of the delay imposed on the initial 
bidder by the ESB.  In this Part we examine whether targets remain 
independent in the longer run, defined as the thirty-month window after bid 
announcement.  
Figure 4 presents basic statistics on the status of the targets in our sample 
thirty months after the initial hostile bid is announced, again divided 
between ESB targets (n=45) and non-ESB targets (n=47).135 
 








































Not surprisingly, the independence rate has decreased for all targets 
relative to Figure 3:  The number of independent ESB targets has declined 
from 27 to 21, and the number of independent non-ESB targets has declined 
from 16 to 11 in this longer timeframe.  The basic finding that ESB targets are 
much more likely to remain independent remains, and in fact becomes even 
more pronounced relative to the short-run analysis:  47% of ESB targets 
remain independent thirty months after the initial hostile bid is launched, 
compared to only 23% of non-ESB targets.  As in the short run, the difference 
is made up of fewer sales to initial bidders (16% of ESB targets versus 34% of 
non-ESB targets) and fewer sales to other bidders (38% of ESB targets versus 
 
135. While it is conceivable that a target could have changed from a non-ESB target 
to an ESB target (or vice versa) between the announcement of the hostile bid and thirty 
months later, none of the targets in our sample did so.  
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43% of non-ESB targets).  These results continue to hold in a multivariate 
regression that controls for other relevant factors in the same way that has 
been used for testing with respect to remaining independent in the short 
run.136 
 
E.    The Cost of Remaining Independent 
 
In the prior two parts we showed that a target can remain independent 
far more often when it has an ESB, both in the short run and in the longer 
term.  In this section we show that target shareholders generally suffer when 
the target remains independent—that is, remaining independent makes the 
shareholders of hostile bid targets worse off compared with the scenario in 
which the bid would have been successful.  It might be argued that 
incumbents retain independence in those instances in which they would be 
able to achieve the same or higher value-creating gains on their own, either 
by achieving stand-alone operational improvements or by providing 
information to the marketplace that corrects an underpricing of their firm.  
The remainder of this section demonstrates that this hypothesis is, on 
average, not correct.   
As a starting point, Table 3 provides aggregate statistics on average 
(mean) shareholder returns by bid outcome.137  These calculations include 
the premiums achieved through subsequent completed bids against targets 
that remain independent, in order to give full credit for management plans to 
sell to a “better” bidder than the initial hostile bidder.  The calculations also 
assume that cash received at any time (for example, at the completion of a 
bid) is reinvested at the risk-free rate, assumed to be 6%.138 
 
 
136.  See Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 3. 
137. We plan to estimate in subsequent work abnormal returns rather than absolute 
returns,  though we do not believe that this adjustment will change our overall 
conclusions.  The bids in our sample are distributed uniformly over the sample period, 
and the market overall moved fairly consistently in an upward direction during this 
time. 
138. Note that using the risk-free rate rather than a market return biases our results 
in favor of ESBs: shareholders in non-ESB targets generally receive cash sooner than 
shareholders in ESB targets; presumably these non-ESB shareholders have opportunities 
to re-invest this cash at higher than the risk-free rate.  We nevertheless use a risk-free 
reinvestment rate assumption as a conservative estimate.  
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Table 3: Shareholder Returns by Bid Outcome and Target Defenses 










15.6% 22.9% 18.2% 25.3% 24.4% 25.0%
Sold to 
Other Bidder
58.1% 63.3% 61.1% 83.1% 91.2% 87.3%
Sold to 
Initial Bidder 
52.5% 43.9% 46.7% 73.0% 65.3% 67.6%
Average 
Return in 
Case of Sale 





40.4% 30.7% 36.3% 54.8% 54.9% 54.7%
 
Table 3 shows large statistical differences in shareholder returns across 
outcomes.  In the short run, targets that are sold to an initial bidder achieve 
nine-month returns that are 29% higher than targets that remain 
independent, and targets that are sold to a white knight achieve an 
additional 14% beyond that.  Combining these two sale outcomes, nine-
month returns in the case of a sale are 55%.  Compared against the 18% 
returns from remaining independent, this result suggests a 36% cost of 
remaining independent in the short run.   
In the long run, targets that are sold to an initial bidder achieve thirty-
month returns that are 43% higher than targets that remain independent; and 
targets that are sold to another bidder achieve an additional 20%.   
Combining the two sale outcomes, thirty-month returns in the case of a sale 
are 80% on average, compared to 25% returns for targets that remain 
independent, yielding a 55% cost of remaining independent in the longer 
term.  
In short, the large and statistically significant differences between 
outcome categories indicate that the shareholders of targets that remained 
independent were made substantially worse off by the defeat of the hostile 
bid compared with the scenario in which the bid would have been accepted.  
This result continues to hold when we control for other factors that might 
influence shareholder returns, in both the short run (9 months) and the long 
run (30 months).139 
 
 
139. See Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 3.  
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F.     Do ESBs Produce Offsetting Benefits by Increasing Premiums? 
 
So far we have demonstrated that an ESB allows a target to remain 
independent more often against a hostile bid and that remaining 
independent is generally rather bad for target shareholders.  Against these 
costs, however, ESBs might provide countervailing benefits for target 
shareholders.  One such benefit might be increased bargaining power for 
target managers, which in turn would raise the premium in the event of an 
acquisition.  If true, this theory would be consistent with some poison pill 
studies showing that higher premiums are correlated with whether the target 
has adopted a poison pill prior to a hostile bid or friendly merger.140 
In this Part we consider the theory that ESBs might create value for target 
shareholders by providing target managers with greater bargaining power 
(“bargaining power hypothesis”).  As a starting point, Table 2 shows that the 
average final bid that a hostile bidder makes for an ESB target is 44.1% over 
the pre-bid market price, compared with 42.4% average final bid premium 
for non-ESB targets.  Focusing only on successful bids, we find that the final 
acquisition premium is 54.4% for targets with ESBs and 49.6% for targets 
without ESBs.  While this 5% difference in favor of ESBs provides some 
marginal evidence in favor of the bargaining power hypothesis, a statistical 
test indicates that it is not statistically significant (t=0.76).  An ordinary least 
squares regression, with final bid premium as the dependent variable, and 
controlling for the other relevant factors, similarly indicates that the 
coefficient for ESB is not statistically significant in predicting bid premium 
(t=0.74).141   
Given the lack of any significant differences in premiums, it is 
unsurprising that shareholder returns are not statistically different between 
ESB and non-ESB targets that are sold.  Examining the columns of Table 3, 
we find that short-run returns for targets that are sold are 56.0% when there 
is an ESB, and 53.6% when there is not.  In the long-run, returns for ESB 
targets that are sold are 80.1%, compared to 79.3% for non-ESB targets.   
Neither of these differences is statistically significant.  While these results do 
not rule out the possibility that premiums and returns against ESB targets 
might be higher (and statistically significant) if we were to examine a larger 
 
140. See A BOUMERI,  supra  note 120; J.P. MORGAN  & CO., POISON  PILLS AND 
ACQUISITION  PREMIUMS  (1995) (on file with authors).  But see Coates,  supra  note 58 
(arguing that pre-bid pills should be irrelevant due to the “shadow pill”). 
141. For more details on this regression, which uses the same independent variables 
as the regressions whose results were reported earlier, see Bebchuk, Coates & 
Subramanian, supra note 3. Alternative specifications (including using the log of deal 
premium as the dependent variable) yield similar results.  
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sample, the data do suggest that the differences are not of the order of 
magnitude that would be necessary to offset the large differences in the 
likelihood of achieving these premiums. 
In short, ESBs do not seem to provide sufficiently large countervailing 
benefits for shareholders of hostile bid targets, in the form of higher deal 
premiums, to offset the substantially lower likelihood of being acquired.  In 
fact, the evidence is not sufficient even to conclude that there is any positive 
effect at all of ESBs on deal premiums, though we cannot reject this 
possibility with our small-sample analysis.  However, even if future research 
were to conclude that ESBs do yield higher premiums for target shareholders 
in deals that are successful, ESBs do not seem to have a major impact on 
premiums of the kind that would be necessary to outweigh their negative 
effects on bid outcomes.   
 
G.     Overall Effect on Target Shareholder Value 
 
To summarize the argument thus far, we have shown that (1) ESBs 
substantially increase the likelihood of remaining independent; (2) remaining 
independent is quite costly compared with accepting the bid; and (3) ESBs do 
not provide sufficient countervailing benefits (and may produce no benefits 
at all) in terms of increasing the premium in the event of an acquisition.  We 
now aggregate these various elements and quantify them in order to 
calculate the overall effect of ESBs on target shareholder value. 
 
1.  General findings. 
 
The effect of ESBs on shareholder wealth can be disaggregated into two 
pieces: first, the increased likelihood of remaining independent that an ESB 
provides; and second, the cost associated with remaining independent.  We 
have shown so far that both pieces are substantial:  Figure 3 shows that the 
likelihood of remaining independent is 26% higher for ESB targets; Table 3 
shows that the short-run cost of remaining independent is 36%.  This Part 
quantifies this effect more carefully. 
As a starting point we examine total shareholder returns, irrespective of 
bid outcome, for ESB and non-ESB targets.  Shareholders in the ESB targets 
in our sample achieved 31.8% returns in the nine months after a hostile bid 
was announced, compared to 43.4% returns for the shareholders in non-ESB 
targets, representing an 11.6% difference.  As noted above, this difference is 
driven entirely by the difference in success rates for the hostile bidders 
between the two samples. 
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2.  Controlling for other parameters. 
 
Of course, to make a more accurate assessment of the overall effect of 
having an ESB, it is necessary to control for other factors that might have an 
independent impact on bid outcomes.  Our samples of ESB targets and non-
ESB targets may have different characteristics that may lead us to mis-
estimate the wealth effects of ESBs when we look only at simple averages.  
To take an extreme example, if all ESB targets also had fair price provisions 
and all non-ESB targets did not, and if fair price provisions had an 
independent impact on either bid outcomes or bid returns, then some of the 
effect that we attribute to ESBs should in fact be attributed to the fair price 
provisions.   
If a bid is made, expected returns to shareholders equal: 
 
Prob (Acquisition by Initial Bidder) * E [Return STIB] 
 
+ Prob (Acquisition by White Knight) * E [Return STWK] 
 
+ Prob (Independence) * E [ Return conditional on no acquisition] 
 
Table 4 synthesizes the results reported earlier to display the differences 





















13.8% 34.0% -20.2% 























on a bid 
being made) 
32.4% 41.6% -9.2% 
Notes:  Event window is one month prior to bid announcement to nine 
months after bid announcement, and includes returns from subsequent 
acquisitions by other bidders. 
Probabilities and returns are calculated using the method of recycled 
predictions, and control for other factors, as described in Part IV.C.2, that 
may influence bid outcomes.  Using simple means instead yields similar 
results. 
Model assumes that cash received at any time (e.g., at the completion of a 
bid) is reinvested at the risk-free rate (assumed to be 6%).   
 
Table 4 shows no statistically significant differences in the returns to 
target shareholders by type of defense, conditional on a particular outcome  
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being realized.  However, the dramatic differences in likelihood of outcomes 
yield substantial differences in the expected returns to target shareholders.  
Using the window from one month prior to bid announcement to nine 
months after bid announcement, the expected returns to target shareholders 
when an ESB is not present are 41.6%, compared to 32.4% when an ESB is 
present, a 9.2% difference in returns. 
We also estimated the difference in returns using the method of recycled 
predictions.  We ran a robust regression to predict nine-month returns, 
including ESB as a dummy variable in the model and controlling for 
variables that also might influence bid outcomes and bid returns.142  We then 
predicted returns in two scenarios: one in which all ninety-two targets have 
ESBs and one in which none of the ninety-two targets have ESBs.  The results 
of this analysis indicate that nine-month returns are 32.2% for our set of ESB 
targets and 40.4% for our set of non-ESB targets, an 8.2% difference. 
Taken together, our calculations suggest that an ESB reduces target 
shareholder returns on the order of 8-10% in the nine months after a hostile 
bid is launched.  This finding is consistent with studies showing that the 
Massachusetts staggered board statute reduced the value of companies 
incorporated in Massachusetts.143 
It is worth noting that the losses to shareholders we have estimated in 
this Part are only those that are produced when bids are made.  Because 
ESBs greatly enhance the power of incumbents to resist hostile bids, they 
substantially curtail the threat that such bids pose to incumbents.  As a 
 
142. See Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, supra note 3. The coefficient for ESB is 
negative (-0.08), consistent with our theory, but the standard error is sufficiently large 
(0.10) that the variable is not statistically significant at 95% confidence.  At least part of 
the difficulty arises from the high variability of returns that arises from our relatively 
long event window.  Other commentators have noted the difficulties in examining stock 
returns over long event windows.  See, e.g., Brad M. Barber & John D. Lyon, Detecting 
Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns: The Empirical Power and Specification of Test Statistics, 43 
J. FIN. ECON. 341, 342-43 (1997) (finding that long-run tests are misspecified and 
identifying new listing bias, rebalancing bias, and skewness bias as reasons); S.P. 
Kothari & Jerold B. Warner, Measuring Long-Horizon Security Price Performance, 43 J. FIN. 
ECON. 301, 301 & 337 (1997) (finding that tests of multi-year abnormal returns around 
firm-specific events are “severely misspecified” and concluding that “the interpretation 
of long-horizon tests requires extreme caution”); Craig E. Lefanowicz & John R. 
Robinson, Multiple Bids, Management Opposition, and the Market for Corporate Control, 35 
FIN. REV. 109 (2000) (excluding acquisitions that took more than 250 days to complete 
“because of the problems . . . in cumulating abnormal stock returns over long event 
windows”). 
143.  See L. Mick Swartz, The Massachusetts Classified Board Law, 22 J. ECON. & FIN. 29 
(1998); Robert Daines, Do Staggered Boards Affect Firm Value? Takeover Defenses After 
the Poison Pill (working paper, on file with authors).  
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result, ESBs might also produce additional costs in terms of adverse ex ante 
effects on managers’ behavior and performance.  Studying and estimating 
these ex ante effects is an important issue left for future empirical research. 
 
V.    DID SHAREHOLDERS CONSENT? 
 
We have thus far shown that ESBs are by far the most important takeover 
defense mechanism in the market for corporate control and that they have a 
substantial negative impact on the wealth of target shareholders.  Defenders 
of ESBs might nevertheless suggest that, whether ESBs are good or bad for 
shareholders, ESBs received shareholder approval.  An SB must be specified 
in the charter in order to become an ESB, and a charter provision must be 
specified either at the IPO stage (at which time shareholders would have 
implicitly accepted the provision by purchasing the IPO shares) or through 
midstream charter amendment (which requires a shareholder vote).  In either 
case, goes the argument, shareholders would have consented to the ESB. 
In this Part, however, we argue that even though all ESBs received formal 
approval from shareholders, the potency of ESBs as an antitakeover device 
was never genuinely consented to by the shareholders of the large majority 
of companies that now have ESBs.  Thus, the effects of ESBs that we 
document were largely unintended by target shareholders when provisions 
establishing staggered boards were included in corporate charters.  To put it 
more starkly, our argument is that, in most ESB companies, shareholders 
could not have reasonably expected, when provisions establishing staggered 
boards were adopted, that these provisions would subsequently gain the 
powerful antitakeover significance that we have documented.144 
 
A.  A Brief History of Takeovers and Staggered Boards:  
From Inco to Moran to Time 
 
Before the invention of the poison pill, the staggered board was fairly 
innocuous as a takeover defense.  As described in Part III.A, a staggered 
 
144. The “mid-stream problem” resulting from the adoption of charter provisions 
prior to the developments in takeover law that gave them substantial antitakeover 
significance was highlighted in Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra  note 46.  We provide below 
empirical evidence of the very substantial magnitude of the problem as far as charter 
provisions establishing staggered boards are concerned.  We believe the picture is 
similar with respect to other kinds of antitakeover charter provisions.  See also Lucian 
Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution, NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2002) (discussing the problem of mid-stream changes in takeover law); 
Sharon Hannes, The Determinants and Consequences of Corporate Stagnation: 
Discussion and Reform Proposal (2001) (working paper, on file with authors) 
(discussing the problem of “stagnation” of corporate arrangements).  
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board could not block a bidder from acquiring a control block and creating a 
situation in which a board control shift would be inevitable.  Given this 
inevitability, a lame-duck incumbent board would resign rather than wait 
through two elections.  As a result, target boards were unable to use 
staggered boards to block beneficial acquisitions of a controlling block.145  
The pre-pill era can itself be divided into two distinct periods.  Before 
Inco’s successful tender offer for ESB in 1974, hostile tender offers were 
uncommon, particularly for large, established targets.146  Thus it is unlikely 
that the staggered boards that were adopted prior to 1974 were adopted for 
takeover defense reasons.147  Even after hostile bids became part of the 
acceptable toolkit in 1974, neither shareholders nor managers could foresee 
the advent of the pill, which would cut off the tender offer route and force 
shareholders to depend on the ballot box as a safety valve against disloyal 
managers.  As a result, although true motives are difficult to discern, 
managers typically proposed staggered boards before 1984 primarily for 
board stability reasons and shareholders approved staggered boards in that 
period primarily for board independence reasons, as described in Part II.C.1.  
From our sample of Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) 
companies,148 Figure 5 below  shows that 6% of staggered boards were 
installed pre-Inco, and another 17% were installed before Moran validated the 
poison pill.  Thus, roughly one-quarter of staggered boards in place today 




145. In fact, during this period, even deals that were not beneficial might have 
succeeded.  During the era before the poison pill, target shareholders ran the risk that if 
they did not tender, they would be squeezed out in a back-end squeeze-out (at a lower 
price) if the bidder won.  See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.  In fact, acquirers 
during this era exploited this possibility through two-tier tender offers, cascading 
tender offers, and other coercive tender offer structures.  See Guhan Subramanian, A 
New Takeover Defense Mechanism: Using an Equal Treatment Agreement as an Alternative to 
the Poison Pill, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 375, 387-389 (1998). 
146. See BRUCE WASSERSTEIN, BIG DEAL 73 (1998). Morgan Stanley’s willingness to 
represent Inco in its bid gave hostile bids a new respectability.  See id. 
147. It is possible that some pre-Inco SBs were adopted to defend against pure 
proxy fights, of the sort that were not uncommon in the 1950s.  But proxy fights in that 
era were rarely coupled with hostile takeover bids, such that the dynamics and likely 
effects of those fights on target shareholder returns were vastly different than proxy 
fights designed to facilitate takeover bids. 
148. Described in Part II.B, supra. 
149. Weighting by sales or net assets yields virtually the same breakdown of SB 
timing.   
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100% = 712 companies
 
Moreover, while Moran changed the landscape, it initially appeared to 
change it only slightly.  After Moran, a bidder would have to use the ballot 
box to gain control of the board, but an alternative, viable route to bid 
success appeared to remain over and beyond the proxy mechanism because 
of the qualified right for target boards to resist a hostile offer.  The line of 
cases beginning with Moran and proceeding through AC Acquisitions Corp.,150 
Revlon,151 Interco,152 and Macmillan,153 all demonstrated that the right to resist 
a hostile bid was not absolute, and suggested that Delaware courts would 
continue to interpret a target board’s fiduciary duties so as to enable hostile 
bids to succeed even without a proxy fight. 
Figure 5 shows that 53% of staggered boards were installed after Moran 
but before Time.  During this period, managers were no doubt motivated by 
the threat of hostile takeover in proposing staggered boards.  Shareholders, 
meanwhile, generally approved staggered boards during this period because 
a hostile bidder still had a viable route against a disloyal target board.  When 
a bidder made an offer that shareholders wanted, the case law suggested that 
the Delaware courts would force a redemption of the pill if the target board 
did not redeem the pill on its own. 
Time, of course, seemed to change all that.  To many observers, Time 
transformed what was a highly qualified right to use the pill into a 
seemingly absolute right to “Just Say No.”  Cases such as Wallace Computer 
have shown that courts will allow incumbents to retain a pill and resist a 
 
150. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 
1986) (enjoining defensive recapitalization under Unocal). 
151. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A. 2d 173 (Del. 1986) 
(enjoining asset lockup and other defensive actions under Unocal). 
152. City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) (enjoining 
recapitalization and mandating redemption of pill under Unocal). 
153. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989) (enjoining 
management buyout, following earlier decision to enjoin defensive recapitalization).  
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hostile bid indefinitely.154  Figure 5 shows that only a quarter of staggered 
boards appeared post-Time, in the modern pill era.  Even this figure 
overstates the number of truly new staggered boards that appeared in the 
1990s.  Many staggered boards came from IPOs, where shareholder approval 
was not necessary (for example, OfficeMax, Bed Bath & Beyond, Adobe).155  
Many others came from spin-offs, a type of IPO where market discipline is 
weakened by the fact that the pre-IPO “owner” is itself a public company 
(for example, Aviall, spun off from Ryder).156  Finally, many others in the 
sample came from mergers, in which the surviving company adopted the 
staggered board in conjunction with the merger (for example, MCA, Morgan 
Stanley/Dean Witter, Alumax).  In these deals, the staggered board vote is 
bundled with the merger vote, and shareholders do not have the ability to 
vote in favor of the deal without also approving the staggered board. 
 
B.     Assessing the Degree of Shareholder Consent 
 
The analysis in the previous Part suggests that shareholders in companies 
that adopted ESBs before 1990—which is the vast majority of ESB companies 
today—could not have reasonably contemplated when the ESBs were 
adopted that subsequent legal developments would make them such a 
strong antitakeover device.  Indeed, although such predictions are inherently 
speculative, we believe that if these shareholders had been asked to ratify the 
ESBs of their companies after 1990, when the antitakeover significance of 
ESBs became known, they would have most likely refused to do so.   
The reason for this prediction is that, as documented in Part II.D, 
midstream companies have been largely unable to obtain shareholder 
approval for staggered boards since 1990.  In fact, quite the opposite, 
institutional investors have been increasingly proposing, and shareholders 
have been increasingly voting for, precatory resolutions calling for de-
staggering the board.  This evidence suggests that shareholders of companies 
that adopted ESBs pre-1990 would generally vote against having staggered 
boards if the issue were presented to them post-Time.  
It might be argued that the preferences of the shareholders of companies 
with pre-1990 ESBs can be inferred not from their opposition to midstream 
adoption of staggered boards in the 1990s, but rather from the fact that many 
shareholders continue to buy shares in companies that went public in the 
1990s with a staggered board.  One of us, in other work, documents the 
 
154. See supra text accompanying notes 68-73. 
155. See Coates, supra note 2 (documenting the increase in staggered boards among 
IPO companies). 
156. See Daines & Klausner, supra note 2.  
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growing trend in staggered board incidence in IPO companies during the 
1990s.157  However, in the case of these 1990s IPOs, the IPO price might have 
at least partly reflected the presence of strong antitakeover defenses, and the 
IPO price thus might have at least partly compensated public shareholders 
for the adverse effects of an ESB on their interests.158  In the case of pre-1990 
ESBs, shareholders presumably could not have been compensated at the time 
the ESBs were adopted for the current, then unanticipated, antitakeover 
significance of the ESB-pill combination.  
Thus, if shareholders of companies that adopted ESBs prior to 1990 were 
asked post-1990 to ratify the antitakeover use of their ESB, the choices that 
they would have been confronted with would have been most similar to 
those of shareholders that would have been asked in the 1990s to approve 
amending the charter to establish an ESB.  This comparison, if correct, 
strongly suggests that shareholders of most ESB companies today have never 
given genuine consent to the powerful antitakeover device currently 
provided by ESBs—and would not have given such consent if provided an 
opportunity to express their views on the matter. 
To summarize, in the vast majority of companies that have staggered 
boards today, the presence of strong antitakeover protections cannot be 
grounded in genuine shareholder consent.  Rather, it is largely the 
unintended consequence of two unrelated sets of events:  uninformed 
approval of staggered boards by shareholders when staggered boards had 
little impact on hostile bids, and a series of fact-specific court decisions that 
increasingly channeled hostile bids into the ballot box route.  For lawmakers, 
this state of affairs should seem unsatisfying, to say the least.  This concern, 
however, would be addressed by the approach to takeover law that we put 
forward in the next Part.  
 
157. See Coates, supra note 2, at 1353, 1376; sources cited supra note 2. 
158. Of course, a question remains as to why pre-IPO owners have chosen in the 
1990s to include ESBs in IPO charters.  One of us, in the same work cited above, argues 
that law firm characteristics play a key role in determining the antitakeover provisions 
that are installed at the IPO stage.  See Coates, supra note 2, at 1370-75.  Another possible 
(not mutually exclusive) explanation is that takeover defenses may not be adequately 
priced in the secondary market.  See Lucian Bebchuk, Freedom of Contract and the 
Corporation: An Essay on the Mandatory Role of Corporate Law, Discussion Paper No. 
46, Program in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School (1988); Daines & Klausner, 
supra note 2.  Yet another explanatory factor is that, when private benefits of control are 
correlated with firm value and firm value is better known to owners than to public 
investors, owners will have incentives to choose excessive levels of protection for 
private benefits in order to avoid an inference by public investors that their firm is of 
low value.  See Lucian Bebchuk, Asymmetric Information and Corporate Governance 
(2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).  An analysis of the imperfections 
of the IPO process is, of course, beyond the scope of the current project.   
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VI.    IMPLICATIONS FOR TAKEOVER LAW 
 
In view of the powerful antitakeover impact and negative wealth effects 
of ESBs, and the common absence of genuine shareholder approval for these 
arrangements, we now turn to discuss how takeover law should approach 
them.  We focus on the corporate law of Delaware, the most important law 
domicile for U.S. corporations, and on solutions that can be implemented 
taking as given the existing structure of Delaware case law.  In Part VI.A we 
describe our recommended approach in the absence of a genuine opt-out by 
shareholders.  We then address the question of whether shareholders should 
be allowed to opt-out of such a regime.  
 
A.     Redeeming Pills Following Defeat in One Election 
 
The basic approach we propose can be stated simply:  Courts should not 
allow managers to continue blocking a takeover bid after they lose one 
election conducted over an acquisition offer.  Note that without an ESB, no 
court intervention is necessary in order to achieve this outcome.  If managers 
of a non-ESB target are defeated in one election, the bidder will gain control 
of the board and will be able to redeem the pill and consummate the bid.  
However, with an ESB, in the absence of a court order to redeem the pill, 
incumbents will be able to retain independence even after losing one election 
over one third of the directors.  Under our proposal, after the loss of one 
election that is effectively a referendum on the offer, incumbents should be 
required to redeem the pill and allow the bidder (whose offer has received 
shareholder support) to proceed with its bid. 
Compared to other ways of reducing the power of ESBs that we have 
considered, our recommended approach has several advantages.  First, our 
approach sits well with the basic principles of existing Delaware case law.  In 
fact, we argue that our approach is called for by these principles once the 
special antitakeover power of ESBs is recognized.  Second, and following 
from the first point, our approach requires no legislative intervention and 
can be easily implemented by the courts.  Third, our approach involves 
minimal disruption to the existing corporate governance regime, because it 
prevents ESBs from having adverse and unwarranted antitakeover effects 
without undermining the other, non-takeover reasons for board 
classification.  In the remainder of this Part we discuss each of these points in 
turn.  
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1.  Consistency with fundamental principles of Delaware case law. 
 
First, even if our approach represents a departure from current trends, we 
believe that it better reflects the fundamental principles of the Delaware case 
law.  An important factual assumption of current takeover jurisprudence has 
been the existence of a ballot box safety valve against incumbents who abuse 
the power to maintain the pill.  However, as we have shown theoretically 
and confirmed empirically, this assumption is incorrect in the case of targets 
with ESBs.  Because of the illusory nature of the ballot box safety valve 
against ESB targets, the fundamental principles of takeover law justify (if not 
require) courts’ intervention to order managers to redeem the pill following 
one proxy contest’s defeat. 
To see why, begin with Unocal, which allows managers to engage in 
defensive action only as long as they maintain balance and “proportionality” 
in relation to the perceived threat from the hostile bidder.159  Once it is 
understood that the ballot box route is hardly viable against an ESB target, 
maintaining a pill after a shareholder referendum in favor of the bidder can 
be readily construed as disproportionate to the threat posed.  Thus, once the 
consequences of an ESB are fully recognized, our approach could be viewed 
as an application of the “intermediate” standard of review announced in 
Unocal.   
Our approach is also consistent with Moran, which states that directors 
should not use a pill to “arbitrarily reject” an offer made by a hostile 
bidder.160  Refusing to concede after losing an informed shareholder 
referendum on a bid could fairly be considered “arbitrary,” and thus within 
this intent.  More generally, while Moran reserves for the court the right to 
order the redemption of the pill when appropriate circumstances arise, 
courts have historically declined to use this power, in large part due to their 
belief that the ballot box safety valve is a viable check against excessive 
abuse.  Once it is recognized that the ballot box route may not be a viable 
check against disloyal directors of ESB targets, a court-ordered redemption 
of the pill after the loss of one proxy contest over the bid would be a sensible 
use of Moran’s mandate. 
Our approach is also consistent with Unitrin.  Even though this case is 
known for giving especially strong support to defensive tactics, it still 
maintains that such tactics cannot be “preclusive” and must fall within a 
 
159. Under Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court outlined a two-prong analysis:  
First, the target board must have some basis for concluding that the hostile bid poses a 
threat to the company; and second, the defensive measure “must be reasonable in 
relation to the threat posed.”  Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.  
160. See Moran, 500 A.2d  at 1354.  
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“range of reasonableness.”161  Given our finding that not a single bidder in 
the second half of the 1990s won two elections against incumbents protected 
by an ESB,162 our proposed approach flows directly from Unitrin’s 
requirement that a target’s defensive response not “preclude” hostile bids.  
Our analysis suggests that, unless managers are allowed to use a pill-ESB 
combination to force only one election rather than two, the pill-ESB 
combination becomes preclusive.  Our approach is also consistent with 
Unitrin’s requirement that a target’s defensive response fall within a “range 
of reasonableness”:  For a target board to continue to maintain a poison pill 
in place after losing an election fought over a given bid—with the full 
opportunity that such a vote provides for target directors to articulate why 
the bid is not in the interest of shareholders generally—can readily be 
characterized as unreasonable.   
In short, by focusing on the fact that a target has already lost an initial 
proxy contest in the context of a given bid, our approach provides a way for 
Delaware courts to create boundaries on the scope of “Just Say No” in a way 
that is consistent with existing jurisprudence on the issue.163  It is helpful to 
note that our approach would not differ in terms of the actual holding, 
though it would differ in reasoning, from Wallace Computer.  Recall that in 
that case a federal district court, applying Delaware corporate law, refused to 
order managers armed with an ESB and a pill to redeem the pill even though 
more than 70% of the shareholders had tendered into the offer.  Although we 
would not be inclined (unlike the Wallace court) to allow managers to retain 
the pill indefinitely, our approach would not call for judicial intervention at 
the point at which such intervention was requested in Wallace.  Under our 
approach attracting enough tenders would not be sufficient to require 
redemption of the pill—there needs to be a shareholder vote as well.164  Only 
after incumbents have lost an election fought over a bid should they be 
required to redeem the pill. 
 
161. The second prong of the Unocal test was elaborated in Unitrin to mean that a 
defense could be neither preclusive nor coercive, and must otherwise fall in a “range of 
reasonableness.”  Unitrin, 651 A.2d  at 1387-88. 
162. See supra Part IV.B. 
163.C f .   Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for 
Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247 (1989). 
164. For the view that expression of shareholder support through a vote and not 
only through tender decisions is necessary for a hostile takeover, see Bebchuk, supra 
note 80; Bebchuk & Hart, supra note 86.    
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2.  Legislative intervention not required. 
 
Because our approach is consistent with the basic principles of existing 
jurisprudence, it could be implemented by the Delaware courts without the 
need for legislative intervention.  We believe that this feature makes it more 
attainable at a practical level.  In other work, two of us have independently 
shown that the passage of antitakeover legislation helps states attract and 
retain incorporations.165  To the extent that the Delaware courts are less 
influenced by the desire to attract incorporations than are state legislatures, 
courts may be more likely to take steps that, although highly warranted, 
would have the effect of reducing the level of protection from takeovers.  
In addition to this practical benefit, a judicial solution would also have a 
substantive benefit over a legislative approach.  A legislative solution would 
most likely involve the elimination of SBs from the menu of options.  As 
discussed in Part II.C.1, however, there may be legitimate, non-takeover 
related reasons to have SBs.  A judicial approach would preserve these 
benefits by requiring redemption of the pill only after the incumbent board 
has lost one election to a hostile bidder.  Outside the context of a hostile 
takeover, SBs would continue to function as they do at present.  Therefore, a 
judicial solution would address the problems we have identified in a more 
targeted way than a legislative solution. 
 
3.  Substantial consequences with minimal disruption. 
 
At first sight, this targeted solution may seem so minimalist as to have 
limited practical significance.  After all, only one hostile bidder in our sample 
period, and to the best of our knowledge only five hostile bidders ever, have 
won a first proxy contest conducted over their bid against an ESB:  Moore 
against Wallace Computer, Carson Pirie Scott against Younkers, U.S. Surgical 
against Circon; Boston Bank of Commerce against Carver Bancorp; and 
Weyerhaeuser against Willamette.166  Among these five bids, one was 
eventually sold to the initial bidder (Willamette), two were sold to another 
bidder within a few months after the hostile bidder withdrew (Circon and 
Younkers), and two (Wallace Computer and Carver Bancorp) remained 
independent after losing a first proxy contest.  Therefore, it might be argued 
that our approach would have practical significance for only a small number 
of cases.  
However, this argument misses the point that all the actions of bidders 
 
165. See sources cited supra note 30 
166. Circon occurred during the period we study, Wallace Computer and Younkers 
occurred before it, and Willamette and Carver Bancorp occurred since the end of this 
period.  
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and targets in all takeover contests occur against the background of the 
ultimate powers and threats available to the parties.  With a non-ESB target, 
the viability of the ballot box route influences outcomes not only in those 
cases in which the bidder actually wins a ballot box victory but also in those 
cases in which incumbents proceed to a negotiated sale because they know 
that they would not be able to block an offer that would enjoy shareholder 
support.  Similarly, with an ESB target, the outcome is not only affected in 
the few instances in which the bidder wins the first election and then gives 
up.  It is also affected in the larger number of cases in which bidders give up 
earlier against an ESB knowing how difficult and costly a ballot box victory 
would have to be.  
In our sample, the “shadow of the law” has influenced the outcome of 
hostile bids against all forty-five ESB targets.167  In particular, it has allowed 
twenty-seven of those targets to remain independent in the short run and 
twenty-one to remain independent in the longer-term—a much larger 
fraction than in the case of non-ESB targets.  Thus, while our approach 
would call for judicial intervention only when a bidder wins a proxy contest, 
it would influence the outcomes of bids against all ESB targets. 
In effect, our approach would convert ESB targets into EAT targets for 
takeover purposes—targets for which the board could be fully ousted but 
only at the next annual meeting.  By doing so, our approach would revitalize 
the ballot box safety valve against ESB targets.  This safety valve would 
ensure that managers are unable to pursue a course of action that does not 
ultimately have shareholder support.  Our approach targets precisely the 
antitakeover feature of ESBs while leaving intact other features of SBs that 
may be desirable for non-takeover-related reasons.168 Thus our proposal is 
both significant (by influencing the “shadow” negotiation that occurs in 
every hostile bid contest) and minimally disruptive (by preserving existing 
board structures and allowing staggered boards when they are justified by 
other business considerations). 
 
B.     The Permissibility of Opt-Out 
 
The question arises, as is often the case in corporate law policy 
discussions, whether and to what extent opting out should be allowed.   
Should companies be permitted to opt out of our approach by adopting a 
charter provision that explicitly authorizes boards to maintain a pill even 
when they lose one proxy contest fought over an acquisition offer?  
The question of contractual freedom has been extensively debated 
 
167.C f .   Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 129. 
168. See supra Part II.C.1.  
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elsewhere169 and is beyond the scope of our project.  For those who believe in 
completely unfettered contractual freedom, the answer is necessarily that 
companies should be allowed to opt into any arrangement that receives 
shareholder approval.  This is not our view, nor has it been the view of 
corporate law in general or of takeover jurisprudence in particular.   
Corporate law does not offer companies an unlimited choice.  Rather, it 
offers a certain menu of options from which companies may choose.170  Thus, 
the question is whether the arrangement currently offered by an ESB-poison 
pill combination is one that should be part of the menu from which 
companies may choose. 
Our analysis suggests that the ESB antitakeover device is one that might 
not be worth including in a limited optimal menu of choices—even if one 
wants to include in this menu some options that provide managers with a 
greater veto power than an EAT provides.  We say “if” because the question 
of board veto power is one on which there are different views.171  However, 
even someone who wishes to include in the menu options that provide 
greater, even far greater, veto power than provided by an EAT would be 
well advised to do it through arrangements other than the two-election 
staggered board device.  
One way to expand veto power would be to expand the duration of terms 
to which directors may be elected—an arrangement allowing directors to be 
elected for a period of X years, where X is greater than one, the current 
maximum level.  Another way to expand veto power would be to enable 
votes on the election of directors to take place only after Y months have 
elapsed since the making of the bid.  The first type of arrangement would 
provide directors with a certain guaranteed time after they are elected.  The 
second type of arrangement would provide directors with a certain 
guaranteed period of Y months after a bid is made to prepare and 
 
169. For an overview of the debate, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on 
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1395-1415 (1989). Some 
reasons for constraining contractual freedom in the context of takeover arrangements 
are given in Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The 
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989); Bebchuk, 
supra note 158. For a recent work casting some empirical doubt on the optimality of 
antitakeover arrangements adopted at the IPO stage, see Coates, supra note 2, at 1301. 
170. To take just one of many examples, companies may choose whether 
shareholders can act before the annual election or only at the annual election, but 
companies must hold an election every year and may not opt-out from this requirement.  
Similarly, companies may have elections each year for fewer than all of the directors, 
but most states limit the number of classes in which the board may be staggered.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 10-13. 
171. For a survey and critique of the arguments for board veto power, see Bebchuk, 
supra note 80.   
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communicate alternatives to shareholders.  But both arrangements, however 
much time they provide, would enable a hostile bidder to have at some point 
a one-time, up-or-down referendum on its acquisition offer.   
In contrast, such a one-time, up-or-down referendum on acquisition 
offers is never possible, as we have shown, under the current ESB 
arrangement.  While reasons can be given for providing mangers with a 
certain amount of guaranteed time under one of the two types of 
arrangements above, there is, in our view, no good reason to prevent bidders 
from ever getting a one-time referendum on an offer.  Even if providing 
incumbents with greater veto power is desired, there are better ways to do so 
than through the frictional, ill-functioning arrangement of two votes, one 
year apart.  For this reason, the menu of offered options should not include 
an arrangement under which a hostile bidder would have to win two 
elections, one year apart, in order to gain control. 
 
VII.    CONCLUSION 
 
Effective staggered boards are the most powerful antitakeover device in 
the current arsenal of takeover defense weapons.  An ESB prevents a hostile 
bidder, no matter when it emerges, from gaining control of the target unless 
it can wait at least fourteen months and win two elections that are far apart 
in time.  Because of these impediments, the ballot box route becomes illusory 
against an ESB target. 
We find strong empirical support for this view of ESBs.  ESBs 
substantially increase the likelihood that a target receiving a hostile bid will 
remain independent.  We find that the increased odds of remaining 
independent are quite costly for target shareholders, without providing 
sufficient countervailing benefits in terms of higher acquisition premiums.  
We estimate that an ESB reduces the expected return of target shareholders 
in the nine months after a hostile bid is launched on the order of 8-10%.  The 
negative wealth effect associated with ESBs is particularly problematic from 
a policy perspective because the majority of staggered boards were 
established before the judicial developments that gave them their 
antitakeover potency. 
We put forward an approach that courts could follow to address these 
problems.  Specifically, we propose that target managers should not be 
permitted to maintain a pill after losing a first proxy contest against a hostile 
bidder.  Although our proposal seems to go against the current trend in 
Delaware case law that is solidifying and expanding the “Just Say No” 
defense, it would in fact best serve the principles and concerns underlying 
proportionality review under Unocal.  Essentially, our proposal would 
revitalize the ballot box route, which the Delaware courts have relied on so  
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heavily in developing takeover jurisprudence, but whose existence is 
currently illusory for companies with ESBs.    
Our approach would eliminate the entrenching effects of ESBs by 
addressing both the minimum delay problem and the two-election problem.  
Furthermore, our approach could be implemented easily by courts, without 
requiring legislative change or forgoing the non-antitakeover benefits that 
staggered boards might provide.  This approach could, with little cost and 
judicial intervention, contribute significantly to shareholder welfare and to a 
healthier and more efficient acquisition market.  
 